Setting the Agenda

The Scope to Act on Climate Change Interests for Chinese NGOs

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Abstract

The Chinese state and society are frequently engaged in an area of mutual concern: the increasing threat of climate change. The state is approaching this concern by directing China's development towards a low-carbon economy, where the aim is to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions without limiting economic growth. Societal actors such as social organisations started emerging in China in the 1980s and are to a further extent than before interacting politically with state matters, climate change included.

This thesis explores how societal actors, environmental non-governmental organisation (ENGOs), are interacting with state actors when addressing climate change mitigation issues. Through the two sub-variants of corporatism; societal corporatism and state corporatism, it will analyse whether or not the societal corporate mechanisms are challenging the state corporate mechanisms in the Chinese climate change and NGO politics. Furthermore, this thesis explores to what extent ENGOs are setting and pursuing their own climate change mitigating agendas and to what extent the state or other factors determine those agendas for them. Through the case study of two domestic climate change concerned ENGOs, China Civil Climate Action Network (C-CAN) and China Youth Climate Action Network (CYCAN), this thesis aims to elucidate what cases are on the ENGOs' agendas and how they approach both state, each other and society through their work.

This thesis draws the concluding remarks that state corporate mechanisms are still evident for social organisations' expansion, legitimacy and credibility in China. However, the growth of societal corporate mechanism that target combating climate change is gaining a stronger foothold and withhold the ENGOs' political interaction possibilities with state corporate mechanisms. The international climate change negotiations, the use of online media and private market mechanisms are signs of this growth. Furthermore, the state is inviting ENGOs to join climate change related collaboration projects, despite the various organisations' registration statuses. This leads us to believe that the inclusion of the public in order to address the threat of climate change is a strategy prompted by the state to combat climate change. This thesis also observes that the ENGOs are balancing on the thin boarder between setting agendas that do not threaten the state's authority and agendas that can echo and gain credibility within a less climate change concerned Chinese society.

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To my very own VIPs: my family and friends. You are legends!

Any inaccuracies that might occur in this thesis are solely my own.

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Idun Moe

List of Abbreviations

CANGO- China Association for Non-Governmental Organisations Cooperation

CAS- China Academy of Science

C-CAN- China Civil Climate Action Network

CCP- Chinese Communist Party

CDM-Clean Development Mechanism

CER- Certified Emission Reduction

COP- Conference of the Parties

CO2-Carbon Dioxide

CYCAN- China Youth Climate Action Network

ENGO-Environmental non-governmental organisation

FYP-Five Year Plan

GHG-Greenhouse gasses

GONGO- Government-organized non-governmental organisation

HEI- Higher Education Campaign

I-CAN- Climate Action Network International

IYSECC: International Youth Summit on Energy and Climate Change

MEP- Ministry of Environmental Protection

MOCA-Ministry of Civil Affairs

MOFA- Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOST-Ministry of Science and Technology

NCSC- National Strategic Research Institute for Chinese Cooperation on Climate Change

NDRC-National Development and Reform Commission

NGO- Non-governmental organisation

NLGCC- National Leading Group on Climate Change

PNEU-Private non-enterprise units

SAIC- State Administration for Industry and Commerce Bureau

UN- United Nations

UNDP- United Nations Development Programme

UNFCCC- United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change

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1 Introduction

Under China's one-Party rule Chinese society is to a large extent controlled by the state. The state is, in numerous ways, involved in defining the grounds from which Chinese society develops and on what premises it takes shape. However, Chinese society is establishing itself under very different circumstances since economic reforms were introduced in the 1980s. This has resulted in an increase of social organisations (Saich, 2006, p.1). Consequently, the society is leaving heavier interest representational footprints in the interaction with the state than earlier.

The Chinese state and society are frequently engaged in an area of mutual concern: the increasing threat of climate change. China's world leading emission rates[1] have left the country in a national and international political hot spot requiring it to address domestic climate change policies, preferably sooner rather than later. Social organisations share the state's present concern for the need of emission rate reductions. They have become more aware of and alarmed by the devastating impacts of climate change. Chinese environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs) addressing climate change mitigation[2] are relatively new and few in China. Since 2007, reducing the threat of climate change has been placed on the ENGOs' agendas and treated as a matter of high priority (Schröder, 2011). This thesis seeks to display and explore how the interaction between ENGOs and the state unfolds when involved in a field that holds such high political priority and is so important for both parties. I address this topic with the following research question:

To what extent are Chinese ENGOs setting and pursuing their own agendas related to climate change mitigation and to what extent does the Chinese state and other factors determine those agendas for them?

My research question explores the agendas ENGOs[3] develop based on what they believe is

[1] China surpassed the United States as the World's biggest emitter of greenhouse gasses (GHG) in 2006 (New York Times, 2007).
[2] Mitigation is "activities undertaken to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere" (The Climate Institute, 2010).
[3] I have categorised all the targeted organisations in this thesis doing climate change related work as ENGOs. In the rest of this thesis the term ENGO will be used as a denominating term for the five ENGOs I have based this research on. Even though I look at climate change mitigation work I need to include environment, as the organisations I have studied also include environmental protection as a part of their work. Environmental protection issues are seen as partly separated from climate change mitigation issues since environmental protection also include other issues of concern like biodiversity, which the climate

the best strategy for fighting the threat of climate change in China. By "agendas" I mean the ENGOs' areas of interests and how they incorporate these into their work strategies. This thesis also discusses other societal actors and the state's own approach at handling the threat of climate change. Both parties, the state and the society, are preoccupied with a competitive concern; however their concerns do not enjoy mutual political power.

It is vital and timely to analyse the role these new societal actors' (ENGOs) play in the development of climate change policies. China's climate change mitigation actions are usually discussed in the light of China's performance on the international arena; however the significance of China's domestic conditions should not be neglected but rather highlighted in present research. The thesis aims to emphasise, strengthen and contribute to the research done on the Chinese NGO sector, the role of Chinese domestic climate change actions and policy development.

This thesis analyses how state and society interact, and further touches upon a vital connection between influence and restraint on the ENGOs agenda setting. That is why I have chosen to use the theory of "corporatism"[4] as an approach to this topic. In short, corporatism can be explained as a framework for understanding tugs of war and negotiation between interest organisations and state agencies (Østerud, 2007, p. 79). The framework will help us understand how societal actors relate to the state actors when setting their agenda to be launched. It is exactly this relation between the two parties, which I find interesting to explore, however it is difficult to measure to what extent influence or discipline prevails between the two actors (Østerud, 2007, p. 78). Based on the corporatist theory I expect to make certain findings in this thesis. As a result of the economic reforms the ENGOs enjoy bigger political interaction possibilities, due to a larger extent of societal corporatist mechanisms. This development affects the interaction between the state and society in relation to climate change mitigation and for the ENGOs independent agenda setting opportunities.

In order for me to approach such a vast and fragmented topic as state-society interaction, I have performed a case study of Chinese ENGOs concerned with climate change issues in

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change concern does not cover. In this thesis ENGOs are referred to as NGOs mainly concerned with climate change mitigation issues. This research also excludes the international registered ENGOs that are based in China and focuses exclusively on domestically registered ENGOs.

[4] The term "corporatism" and "corporativism" are used interchangeably throughout the political science literature, but carry the same meaning. As for this thesis, I will use 'corporatism' when referring to this theory.

particular. This case study includes two domestic ENGOs primarily concerned with climate change: China Youth Climate Change Action Network (CYCAN) and China Civil Climate Action Network (C-CAN). The case study will help to illustrate how these ENGOs set their agendas, what activities are on their agendas and what state-society factors determine their role in the domestic climate change concern. The empirical data about the two organisations and the Chinese ENGO sector have been collected through fieldwork in China, where several interviews were conducted. Since this thesis only covers some of China's many ENGOs working with climate change and represents just a small segment of the populous Chinese society, the answer to my research questions will emphasis the ENGOs' own perspectives where my main target is to explore this field "through the eyes" of the ENGOs.

This thesis suggests that ENGOs have recently been given more leeway for interest groups political interaction. The possibilities for political interaction by the ENGOs exist due to the increased extent of societal corporatist governance ENGOs possess under state corporatist mechanisms. This development has appeared mostly as a result of the economic reforms, which loosened the state's grip over society and allowed more social organisations and other private actors to emerge. It has influenced the current between the state and society and eventuated in more actors being involved in the climate change negotiating process, such as the online use of media, international climate change negotiations and private market mechanisms. Additional explanatory factors for the increased political interactions between state and society are the climate change administration's gained and expanded capacity to incorporate ENGOs´ interests, and the state's political will to include the Chinese public to help reach the national emission reduction policies. Whether or not the incorporations of ENGOs is due to the need for public participation to solve the climate change threat or if it is due to their political significance is a difficult assumption to conclude with. Despite the larger extent of societal corporatism, the state corporatist mechanisms still confines the ENGOs from fully engaging in various climate change mitigation strategies and limits the ENGOs from acting upon agendas that yield political power. ENGOs' organisational capacity deprives them the courage and possibilities to enforce their own agendas, which again hampers their position to act as credible actors both in the Chinese society and within the state.

The rest of this thesis will be divided into three parts. In part one I will introduce the thesis' background information. This information consists of chapter 2 where I present my methodological approach and chapter 3 where my theoretical framework, corporatism and its

variants: state corporatism and societal corporatism will be introduced. In Chapter 4 I will present the Chinese national climate change and NGO concerns and administrational agencies involved in determining the ENGOs legal existence and goals. Part two of this thesis, Chapter 5, explores the ENGOs interaction with the state on climate change mitigation and legal issues. However most importantly it presents my findings from the case study I conducted on the two ENGOs: CYCAN and C-CAN. The thesis will then proceed to the third part, chapter 6, where I will discuss and analyse my findings and engage in a further debate on the extent to which the ENGOs agenda setting power is determined under state corporatism and societal corporatism. It further discusses the ENGOs autonomy from and dependence on the state. This chapter will also highlight other problematic factors involved in the ENGOs determination and pursuit of their agendas such as capacity and credibility. Finally I will sum up my findings and conclude in chapter 7.

2 Method

This chapter seeks to present the process of my data collection during the work on this thesis starting from January 2012. In order to answer my research question I have used text analysis and fieldwork as a method. My findings are based on text analyses of both primary and secondary sources. My primary sources are the published materials from CYCAN and C-CAN, the information accessible on the organisations' Internet home pages but also the conducted interviews with the organisations members. Most of my empirical material has been collected through fieldwork in China over a period of 6 weeks from March to April in 2012. My secondary sources are comprised of international and Chinese scholars' research; furthermore I have consulted Chinese state documents and state departments Internet home pages' for information. All the translations of the various non-English sources used in this thesis are exclusively the authors, unless otherwise stated.

2.1 Case Study and Fieldwork

I have chosen to answer my research question by applying a case study as a method. By engaging in this case study on Chinese domestic ENGOs I examined the "hows" and "whys" of ENGOs specific climate change mitigation work and gained insight into their views on their own agendas, the state and the Chinese society. The thesis pursues *how* the Chinese ENGOs and the Chinese state approach climate change mitigation in China, as well as how the Chinese state approaches NGO actions. Case study as a method seeks to explain circumstances on "how" and "why" some social phenomena work and is further a good approach to use when examining contemporary and ongoing events (Yin, 2009, p. 4-7). There is not much existing research dedicated to the branch of ENGOs concerned with climate change, which made me choose to use fieldwork as a means to learn more about them. Moreover, the fieldwork, being a qualitative method emphasizes the importance of "the actor's point of view" (Repstad, 2007, p. 19). Consulting fieldwork as a method has also been vital owing to limited primary sources on the ENGOs included in my case study. In addition to providing me with interviewees and material from the organisations, the fieldwork gave me the chance to join two separate climate change related seminars, one held by the ENGOs themselves and another held by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Due to the maintenance of CYCANs webpage (Cycan, 2012a), hence inaccessibility, during the

initial phase of the thesis the interviews with the members of the organisation and the material I picked up in its office in China, such as printed reports and policy papers published within China, have been of invaluable importance to my findings in the thesis. This has also been the case for my primary sources on C-CAN. Their home page (C-can, 2012c), which, as a result of underfunding is not up-to-date, made the information and written literature obtained during the interviews and visits to their offices, respectively, vital sources. Without the fieldwork the understanding of and findings on the two ENGOs would have been limited.

Qualitative interviews were a natural choice of method when obtaining more in-depth knowledge of the ENGOs' own point of view. I conducted semi-structured interviews with five ENGO officials from six different ENGOs, together with a set of five informal interviews with people involved in various aspects of the Chinese NGO sector. I formally interviewed two members from CYCAN and two members from C-CAN in their offices. The interviews were conducted in English and Chinese. All my formal interviews were recorded in consent with the interviewee. I chose my formal interviewees according to the position they hold in the respective organisation and contacted them by e-mail for an interview request before arriving in China, while other interviews both the formal and informal ones have been a result of the snowball effect. Since I wanted to access information on agenda setting I chose to formally interview people in high and administrative positions as they are involved in the organisations strategic and formality work. To what extent the different organisations were interested in granting an interview varied significantly. I have used material from all the interviews in this thesis. I will explicitly state CYCAN or C-CAN when writing about information on the two organisations, as for information concerning all the other ENGOs I spoke to or ENGOs in general I will use ENGOs.

2.2 Ethical Estimations and the Credibility of Sources

China's political system and the restraints on social organisations' activities pose the risk of coming across ethical issues concerning sensitive state matters (Heimer and Thøgersen, 2006). In order to protect my sources, information acquired during the interviews is not attributed to any individual. The interviews are referred to as "interview 1", "interview 2" and so forth. The informal interviews will similarly be referred to as "informal interview 1", "informal interview 2" and so forth. My thesis aims at presenting research on a small segment

of the societal actors moving about the Chinese domestic climate change arena. That is why I have excluded interviews with other state actors concerned with the matter. Consequently the representation of CYCAN and C-CAN in this thesis will result in specific in-depth research that will contribute to a more generalised view of the Chinese ENGOs that are concerned with climate change (Yin, 2009).

The process of collecting data raises an inevitable question of the credibility of the sources. The use of both the ENGOs home pages and the interviews as sources has made me assess their credibility and reflect on the context in which the material was collected (Thaagard, 2009, p. 179). As previously mentioned Chinese ENGOs do not have many publications issued outside of China nor are their pages kept up-to-date, which are the main reasons for choosing fieldwork as a method. The use of Internet as a trusted source in China is, in general, not unproblematic. In China Internet is used under specific conditions (Yang, 2003, p. 455). The caveats concerning Internet censorship must be taken into account when gathering the information you find there. My other source, the information acquired during the interviews, is a double edged sword (Schostak, 2006). I cannot be certain that my interviewees give me "perfect information" that I can apply to this research. "With every view directed by a subject towards another there is an inter-view, a space between views" (Schostak, 2006, p. 22). In addition to personal perception and capacity regarding a research topic, interviewees can forget to mention aspects or the researcher can ask the wrong questions. Sensitivity issues or other hindrances might also have limited my interviewee's space to grant me full access to their work (Yin, 2009; Shostak, 2006).

The conflicting issues I have met during my research have been numerous and required decision-making based on space limitations, scope conditions and necessary generalisations of concepts. My goal in including fieldwork in this paper has been to obtain information about the case study, which is not offered outside of China. My main task throughout the case study has been to produce analytic generalisation and not particularisation (Yin, 2009). Some nuances encountered during the fieldwork and interviews might have been lost due to language issues, which possibly affect the credibility of this research (Yin, 2009). However I have kept all recordings from the interviews so they can be verified if necessary.

3 Theoretical Framework

In an authoritarian state, such as China, the state is often heavily involved with societal matters, and ENGOs are no exception (Xie, 2009, p. 3). It is important to understand and categorise the relationship between the ENGOs and the state. Corporatism is a useful framework for analysing this relationship. By using this theory I will highlight key elements of how state and society interact when dealing with issues of mutual interest; in this case, the threat of climate change. In this chapter I will first present corporatism followed by the differences between societal and state corporatism. I will also introduce the expected findings in this thesis based on the use of the corporatist theory. Additionally, this chapter includes a section wherein some of the advantages and disadvantages of using corporatism as a theoretical framework are presented.

Before we continue I will briefly mention the use of the term "the state". The Chinese state does not exist independently from persons or institutions since the state institutions do not function independently from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Many scholars equate the state with the CCP. This is where the term "party-state" originates. The term denotes a state in which the CCP, as the core of the state, monopolizes state power (Zheng, 1997, p. 6-12). In this thesis, "the state" is referred to as defined by Zheng (1997). The same issue, the omnipresence of the CCP within state institutions, applies to the Chinese government.[5]

3.1 Corporatism

Corporatism is a structure that comprises the various dimensions in the negotiation process evolving between the state and society in a country (Østerud, 2007, p. 79). Traditionally, corporatism meant a political system with functional representation, where the political organs were composed of selected representatives from organisations, associations, labour organisations and businesses. A state with such a political system would be a corporative state (Østerud, 2007, p. 77). Corporatism is usually presented as a counterpoise to democratic pluralism and free market forces. However, corporatist mechanisms do not explain a political

[5] The thesis will not elaborate on the structure of the Chinese government, however it should be mentioned that the State Council is considered China's government and is China's highest rankning administrative and executive organ (gov.cn, 2012). Most of my interviewees address the government when referring to the authorities in China.

system. The term can be applied both to a polity under communist rule and in democracies. Its generalising character is both an advantage and disadvantage, which we will take a closer look at under 3.3. Furthermore, the term has been associated with fascist governments during the 1930s, but in modern times, corporatism is used to describe different political arrangements under governments exercising various forms of governance (Østerud, 2007, p. 77-79). As defined by Phillippe C. Schmitter, a frequently cited scholar, corporatism is: ”a system of interest representation in which the constituent parts are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and support” (Schmitter, 1979, p.13). In general, this theory is about correlating a country’s society and dividing it into corporate groups, in accordance with their common interests.

3.1.1 State Corporatism and Societal Corporatism

There are two subtypes of corporatism: state corporatism and societal corporatism[6]. The difference between the two lies in the relative strength and autonomy of social organisations in relation to the state. Under state corporatism, the power of the state is predominant (Lu, 2009, p. 147). State corporatism is an authoritarian variant of corporatism. Policy making is based on a “top-down” governance model where the corporative institutions’ primary task is to discipline their members, especially within the trade unions and labour organisations. In state corporatism, the aim of the state is to be a tight organisation whose emphasis is placed on unity, discipline and cooperation (Østerud, 2007, p. 77). Wherein the corporate institutions are tools used to control and conduct various societal sectors. The government may take charge of creating and maintaining the corporatist organisations and grant itself the power to assign or remove leaders at will (Unger and Chan, 1995, p. 31). The state’s relation to NGOs in such an authoritarian variant of governance predominantly revolves around the degree to which the state can use the organisations to achieve better policy results or as implementation tools for political decisions (Alpermann, 2010 p. 125). In addition, NGOs under such “top–

[6] Societal corporatism is also known as ”liberal corporatism” or “pluralism”. In this thesis societal corporatism will be consequently used.

down" mechanisms are primarily used for gathering information on society (Salmenkari quoted in Alpermann, 2010, p. 125).[7]

Societal corporatism means, in brief, a governance mechanism based on a diversity of volunteer organisations who serve as stakeholders in public advice mechanisms and resolution bodies (Østerud, 2007, p. 77). As well as a mechanism that recognises more "bottom-up" demands (Unger and Chan, 1995, p. 40). It is more or less a compromise between capital and labour forces and between the state and the market, which mandates the stakeholders to engage in mutual consultation with each other. Societal corporatism is not establishing itself as a part of an authoritarian decree, but rather develops through the participation of volunteers, which is driven by claims from the "bottom" or invitations from the "top". Additionally it has emerged through connections and associations across the organisations (Østerud, 2007, p. 77). Scholars have observed a development in China after the reform period in the direction of societal corporate mechanisms as playing a bigger role (Unger and Chan, 1995; Saich, 2011).[8] As mentioned in the introduction, the economic reforms in the 1980s introduced market economy and as a result relaxed Party control over society (Unger and Chan, 1995, p. 38). This development is seen as contrary to that of China's neighbouring countries (South Korea and Japan) where corporatist mechanisms were introduced to strengthen the state's grip on economic development, but for China it was a mechanism through which the state's grip could be loosened (Unger and Chan, 1995, p. 38). These tendencies for more liberal societal mechanisms in China will be further discussed throughout the thesis and matters a great deal for the Chinese ENGOs agenda setting and their relation to the state.

Even though the two variants of corporatism are defined here, it is important to add that this separation is a very difficult task to conduct. To decide if, or in what way, the ENGOs are a part of the state organs, or vice versa, is in many ways precarious "Every corporative organ commutes between the influence of participation and discipline of the actors involved with great tension" (Østerud, 2007, p. 77). Due to the fact that tension is difficult to measure, it is necessary to emphasise that research conducted on state-society relations, such as my own,

[7] In this thesis I will only look into the national state corporate organs that deal with climate change. There are climate change corporate organs at three other levels; the provincial, municipal and county (Xie, 2009 p. 11). However, I will exclude these levels in this paper due to space constraints.
[8] This development in China has been named by Unger and Chan, the "East Asian corporatist model" (Unger and Chan, 1995).

contains some opaque information.

Harmony is a slogan for a corporatist system, regardless of whether the harmony is based on consensus (societal) or a "top-down" approach (state). This harmony is very often goal-oriented towards serving a national mission. That is why corporatist solutions often apply to wartime regimes that stress rapid economic development coupled with the aim of enforcing political and social stability (Unger and Chan, 1995, p. 30-32). The concept of social stability and the building of a harmonious society (*hexie shehui*) is in China's case a policy objective that determines a lot of Chinese policy making and implementation practises, both nationally and internationally (Zheng and Tok, 2007). This political concern affects the Chinese ENGOs in several ways, though; especially in relation to the importance of social stability in China and further that growth of interest groups represent a threat to the state.

Drawing on corporatism as an analytical framework, my expected finding throughout this thesis is that ENGOs agenda setting is less determined by "top-down" governed mechanisms and more by "bottom-up" mechanisms, which provide the ENGOs with increased possibilities for political interaction.

3.2 The Variations and Limitations of Corporatism

Corporatism could be criticized as being too general a framework for an analysis of the state and the society. When considering China's Party-state system and consequently its impact on the establishment of entities outside state control, which have the potential to threaten the state's legitimacy or credibility, a generalised state-society relations theory seems inadequate. Not only the complexity of the Chinese state apparatus is omitted from the corporatist theory, but also the complexity of the ENGOs themselves. Applying corporatism, one faces the challenge of having to treat social organisations as a homogenous group in order to analyse them (Fan, M., 2010). A multiplicity of ENGOs exists in China, which consequently stimulates further diversity of relationships with the state. In some cases the organisations operate in a "continuum stretching from a state-dominated extreme to a civil society extreme" (White quoted in Lu, 2009, p. 12).[9] This aspect has been important to keep in mind when

[9] For further reading on the various NGO governmental relationships, Jennifer M. Coston's "A model and Typology of Government-NGO Relationships" (Coston, 1998) is recommended. Her analysis provides us with a model that defines eight possible relationship types based on several dimensions: government's

exploring the differences and similarities between the two ENGOs in the case study.

Referring to the definition of the term "state", other theories that place more emphasis on the characteristics of the Chinese political system have been introduced in the analysis of state-society relations in China. Many alternatives and interesting theories exist, which seek to explain China's state-society relation using other premises than corporatism, such as "fragmented authoritarianism" (Lieberthal and Lampton, 1992), "state-in-society" (Migdal, 2004), "civil society" (Yang, 2003; Deng, 2011) or "dependant autonomy" (Lu, 2009). Furthermore, corporatism does not fully embrace the complexity and fragmentation of both the state and society (Alpermann, 2010). It treats both entities as two separate units and by doing so creates both advantages and disadvantages when applying the theory as an analytic tool. Due to the disadvantages of excluding particularisation, other subdivisions or branches of the corporatist theory have emerged such as "The East Asian Model" (Unger and Chan, 1995) or "Socialist Corporatism" (Pearson, 1997).

The advantages of using corporatism lie in its ideal model and easy applicability when analysing the complexity of the interaction between the state and the society. When treating the state and society as two different political units the interaction between them is easier to categorise and notice. Schmitter (1979) also warns against a definition of corporatism that is so "narrowly attached to a single political culture, regime type or macrosocietal configuration that it becomes, at best, uniquely descriptive rather than comparatively analytic" (Schmitter, p. 8). Schmitter here emphasises the advantage of generalisation, which the corporatist theory offers. I believe this is also an advantage for this thesis when analysing and comparing the interaction between the state and the ENGOs' agendas. However, when we further explore the state-society relation in China in this thesis we must be aware of the above mentioned weaknesses and benefits when using the corporatist approach.

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resistance or acceptance of institutional pluralism, the relative balance of power in the relationship, and the degree of formality and the level of government linkage (*A model and Typology of Government-NGO Relationships* by Coston, J.M., 1998).

4 The State Concern

The purpose of this chapter is to include the overarching national climate change concern held by the Chinese state today. It emphasises the reason behind the increased attention climate change has been given over the last years. Additionally the chapter presents the different state actors in China's climate change administration, their position and responsibility in the domestic climate change policy making[10]. Furthermore this chapter introduces how the state is administrating the NGO sector in China.

4.1 The Climate Change Concern

If we all agree that carbon dioxide emissions are the direct cause for climate change, then it is all too clear who should take the primary responsibility.

–Wen Jiabao, China's Premier December 18 at the Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen, 2009

The statement above displays the pressure China is under into taking responsibility for its emissions. For China, as for many other developing countries, the threat of climate change is a sensitive matter. In China's case its sensitivity is embedded in an inter-linked three-dimensional dilemma: fostering economic development, the need for energy and reducing the threat of climate change consequences (Heggelund, Andresen and Buan, 2010, p. 231-237). This dilemma acts as the backdrop, which determines and sets the framework for China's policies and actions addressing climate change (Heggelund, Andresen and Buan, 2010, p. 230). In 2008 the Chinese government officially recognised human activity as one of the reasons for GHG production (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2008) and due to the various impacts climate change has had on China, the Chinese government has admitted that China's development is not sustainable and must head in a different direction than before (Gørild Heggelund quoted in Moe, 2011, p. 9). China has

[10] By policy making I mean: "a broad statement that reflects future goals and aspirations and provides guidelines for carrying out those goals" (Jenkins, 1978; Rose, 1976; Anderson, 1978 quoted in Osman 2002, p. 5).

therefore started to move its development towards building a low carbon economy[11] (NHDR, 2009/10).

4.1.1 The National Targets and Climate Change Administration.

The first element to be aware of is that of Chinese climate change policies, particularly its energy policy, which are strongly linked to the country's economic policy and development. China's main priority is economic growth (Heggelund, Andresen and Buan, 2010, p. 231). China's development has led to improved conditions and standards of living for its citizens on a large scale, however this development has caused an enormous pressure on access to resources, degraded the environment and caused harmful air quality (Economy, 2003). Secondly, with economic growth comes energy demands. Energy security and expanded energy consumption is a critical tug of war for the country's future economic development and is again linked to the economic obstacles that might arise when taking actions to secure sufficient energy for the population without emitting more CO2. Thirdly, the indication of increased vulnerability due to the threat of climate change and the consequences it threatens on the Chinese population has resulted in a growing concern in the Chinese government (Heggelund, Andresen and Buan, 2010 p. 231-237). The reports of drought, floods and food security issues have been numerous the last couple of years (CCTV, 2012). In 2011, droughts destroyed grain that would have sufficed in feeding 60 million Chinese for a year (Climate Change Info, 2012).

Some of the most recent and clear-cut evidence of the growing concern of the impacts of climate change is the climate change policy shift that took place between the 11th (2006-2010) and the 12th (2011-2015) Five Year Plan (FYP)[12]. To put it simply, the climate change policy shift between the two FYP's has taken the shape from formerly not mentioning to presently including the issue of climate change in the country's national economic and societal plans

[11] A Low Carbon Economy is defined as "...a low carbon economy is one that maximizes carbon productivity, improves capacities for adaptation to climate change, minimizes the negative impacts of climate change, improves human development, and accommodates both inter- and intra-generational needs, thereby laying a foundation for sustainable socioeconomic development. The ultimate objective of a low carbon economy must be to advance human and sustainable development" (NHDR, 2009/10, p. 5- The English translation).

[12] The Five Year Plans have been a central political guidance since the establishment of the People's Republic of China. Historically the FYP was adopted from the Russian model for economic planning in 1953. The Chinese FYP is launched every five years based on the proposals from the CPC's Central Committee. The plan defines objectives, guiding principles and major tasks for China's national economic and social development during the next five years (Mack, 2011; Zhu, 2001).

(Moe, 2011). The aspect that is given most attention to in the policy shift from the 11th to the 12th FYP is not only the political recognition climate change has been given as a topic that needs political action, but rather the change in targets set for energy and carbon intensity[13] (Seligsohn and Hsu, 2011).[14]

What makes the targets in the 12th FYP increasingly ambitious is that by having met last period's targets, the succeeding targets set for this FYP will be even harder to meet. To have a rapid emission reduction over a short period of time gets increasingly harder the more you reduce. These initial reduction policies in the 11th FYP are referred to as the "low-hanging fruit"- policies that are easiest to implement- (Seligshon and Hsu, 2011). Prohibiting coal plants and shutting down polluting factories are examples of easily implemented policies. Climate change policy analysts now believe that the necessary step in order to meet the 12th FYPs targets is the inclusion of the public (Zou Ji, 2012; Schröder, 2010, p. 6). The public participation (*gong gong canyu*) (Schröder, 2010, p. 6) will be discussed in both chapter 5 and chapter 6 as it is of relevance to the ENGOs.

The awareness of the climate change issue, which led to a change within the climate change administration in the Chinese government, has been apparent (Heggelund, Andresen and Buan, 2010). I will briefly mention the trends that took place in the climate change administration from 2007 and onwards. The key institution in China's domestic climate change policy making is the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). It manages the day-to-day business as the leading agency where it is responsible for organising and coordinating domestic decision-making and international negotiations (Central Government 2007a and 2008a quoted in Wübbeke, 2010, p. 4). The NDRC also has its own climate change department. The highest decision-making body of China's climate-change policy is the National Leading Group on Climate Change (NLGCC). The group is, at the time of writing, led by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. Its roles are to coordinate policies, to define climate change and low carbon strategies across government agencies and to represent China's national position in the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Wübbeke, 2010, p. 3).

[13] Energy intensity is the energy use per unit of GDP (Seligsohn and Hsu, 2011). Carbon intensity is the ratio of carbon dioxide emission per unit of GDP (Seligsohn and Levin, 2011).
[14] See Appendix 2 for an overview of the energy and carbon intensity targets organised in tables with explanations.

Climate change is not only a domestic matter, it is also considered a foreign policy matter (Moe, 2011; Interviews, 2012). This is due to the political process of climate change as administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in addition to the NDRC. This foreign policy link to climate change, as we shall see when we take a closer look at the ENGOs, is considered a crucial point on how to approach emission reductions exceeding national targets. The scope of climate change has new and wider boarders than before. This expansion has resulted in an administrational turn, which the climate change issue has taken. Furthermore the widening of the scope has also lead to a simultaneous expansion of sensitivity concerns. Being inter-woven with the economic administrational unit, NDRC, and the foreign affairs' administrational unit, MOFA, climate change has a whole new range of negotiating forces contrary to when it was "perceived solely in scientific terms" (Heggelund, Andresen and Buan, 2010, p. 237). On the other hand while the NDRC holds the administrative role of the climate change and economic policies, the country is now better equipped to work with, supervise and coordinate cross-sectoral challenges associated with climate change and to further incorporate it into China's national development agenda (Lok-Dessallien, 2010; Xinhua, 2011b, p. 12).[15]

4.2 NGO Administration

According to several scholars, NGOs occupy the space between the party-state on the one hand and the society at large on the other, which has only been made possible by the retreat of the state (See Alpermann, 2010; Unger and Chan, 1995; Xie, 2009; Saich, 2006). NGOs are more or less a product of the reform era when the arena for social organisations expanded. It

[15] There are also some more proactive actors involved in the assessment of climate change, both state and non-state actors, like the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) and Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) (Heggelund, Andresen and Buan, 2010, p. 240). In recent years the scientific community has held an increasingly prominent role and has been included in various international research collaboration projects (Moe, 2011 and Heggelund, 2009). Furthermore, state departments have established functional organs and working mechanisms to address climate change in their own work field. To coordinate this work, a liaison office has been established in 2010 within the framework of the NLGCC. Local governments have also established their own working organs in addition to a leading group to coordinate the work of climate change. Other supporting organs, universities and scientific institutions have opened different research organisations to assist the government (Xinhua, 2011b, p. 12). Most recently China has established a think tank, National Strategic Research and International Cooperation Center for Climate Change (NCSC), which is affiliated with the NDRC. It is said that the think tank will provide the NDRC with statistical analysis and reports. Likewise it is believed to be an efficient and helpful channel in providing relevant information both to the Party and also in communicating to foreign partners (Du, 2011).

is further specified that the state is unwilling or unable to carry out the same range of functions and services as before, and that is the reason for the establishment of many social organisations (Saich, 2006, p. 285). This sub-chapter will take us through the significance of the state's registration system for Chinese NGOs. The overall aim is for us to get a clear picture of one of the "top-down" mechanisms which dictates the existence of an NGO and which we can use as a backdrop when looking into the extent to which CYCAN and C-CAN can or cannot set their agendas independently.

The concept and terminology of NGOs carries many meanings and definitions. One definition claims that NGOs are; "national and international nonprofit organisations as well as local membership organisations, often referred to as grassroots or community-based organisations, that represent the public interest (or the interests of groups of citizens) and are separate from the state and the market" (Biagini and Sagar, 2004). In this thesis I am referring to NGOs as social organisations formed by citizens that pursue common goals. The reason why I have chosen this definition are the ENGOs themselves who define their organisations as such (Interviews, 2012). The definition of an NGO is important both to me as a researcher but also to the organisation itself. It is tempting to place a subjective perception of what an NGO is and also what it "should" advocate and achieve in order for it to justify itself as a non-governmental actor. My aim is therefore to look into how the ENGOs define themselves in order for us to get an "inside view" of their work. The NGO activity is in this thesis referred to as "bottom-up mechanisms by societal actors" (Alpermann, 2010, p.132).

4.2.1 Registration Procedures and State Organs

The state tolerated the vast emergence of NGOs in the 1980s. It is said that the regulations concerning proper registration and administration of social organisations took place after the students uprising in 1989 (Alpermann, 2010, p. 132). In China the term non-governmental organisation[16] is widely used. The official term suggests that the notion of an NGO is 'popular organisation' (*minjian zuzhi*). Popular organisations contain three categories:

1. 'social organisation' (*shehui tuanti* or *shetuan*);
2. private non-enterprise unit (*minban feiqiye danwei*);

[16] The direct translation for NGO in Chinese is *fei zhengfu zuzhi* or the English acronym itself; NGO (Alpermann 2010:147). During my interviews, the organisations themselves used the English acronym or the Chinese abbreviation of *shehui tuanti*, which is *shetuan*.

3. foundation (*jijinhui*) (Lu, 2009, p. 3).

Social organisations are officially defined as "non-profit organisations which are formed voluntarily by Chinese citizens in order to realise the shared objectives of their members and which carry out activities according to their charters" (State Council 1998a quoted in Lu, 2009, p. 3). Private non-enterprise units (PNEUs) are defined as non-profit social service organisations which are set up by enterprises, service units, social organisations, other social forces or individual citizens using non-state assets" (State Council 1998b quoted in Lu 2009:3). Social organisations are membership organisations, but PNEUs are not. Foundations are defined as "non-profit legal entities that employ assets donated by actual persons, legal entities or other organisations for the purpose of engaging in public benefit activities". Like PNEUs, foundations are non-member organisations. Any social organisation or PNEU must be approved and registered at the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) at the county level or above, in order to exist lawfully. Foundations must be approved at the provincial or central government level. However, there are a few exceptions. The mass organisations (*qunzhong tuanti*) and people's organisations (*renmin tuanti*) do not have to register. I will not go into detail regarding this kind of organisational category, but it can be mentioned that these organisations are more or less state agencies. They were created by the state and often hold administrative functions on its behalf (Lu, 2009, p. 3). Lastly, there are government-organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs), which are, as the name states; NGOs, which are founded by the government. GONGOs tend to be elitist associations with close ties to state agencies and consist mainly of scholars, policy-makers and government officials. Due to these close ties they may be quite efficient (Heggelund, 2009, p. 162). Based on this description GONGOs seem to be moving in the wake of state corporatist mechanisms. Additionally many of the GONGOs were established as a result of bureaucratic downsizing, requiring the state to find new employment for former officials (Alpermann, 2010, p. 132). This thesis mainly looks into the situation of social organisations with an unofficial NGO registration status and discusses their relation to an officially registered NGO.

Current regulations require that every officially registered NGO must have a professional management unit (*yewu zhuguan danwei*) to act as its sponsoring agency. After obtaining a sponsor an NGO can apply for registration at MOCA. In addition the sponsor must be a state organ above the county level, or an organisation authorised by such an organ. It must also be relevant to the activities proposed by the NGO - the sponsor must have the same responsibilities in the same field in which the NGO operates (also called "the dual

management system") (Lu, 2009, p. 44). Nevertheless state agencies are under no obligation to accept applications for sponsorships from NGOs in their field. According to Lu (2009), current regulations also disallow NGOs with similar remits coexisting in the same geographical area. For example, in Beijing regulations state that a maximum of one NGO serving the Beijing football club *Beijing Guoan*, can officially be registered. As a result of these rules, many NGOs have been unable to register either due to the lack of a sponsor or due to similarities to existing and registered organisations. Some NGOs, in order to exist legally, register as businesses with the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) and have received preferential attention by international donor agencies (Lu, 2009, p. 4-5). Lastly, there are many NGOs that are unregistered and, hence, illegal organisations that carry out activities openly and have been left alone by the government. They are believed to exist because of the government's limited capacity to enforce the NGO regulations. Further it is also claimed that the existence of many organisations with diverse legal statuses has contributed to the government's failure to put the sector in good order (Lu, 2009, p. 4-5). Another reason for the disregard of unregistered organisations is their limited threat to the state or social stability.

The registration procedures for NGOs in China are complex and a subject of frustration among the ENGOs I have talked to. Most of the ENGOs I was in contact with during the fieldwork called themselves social organisations (*shetuan*) because they identified with the State Council's definition from 1998, however they are not registered at MOCA and are not member based (Interviews, 2012).

What makes the presentation of the above mentioned legal framework interesting in regards to Chinese ENGOs is that these procedures are heavily influencing ENGOs' actions. The ENGOs in my case study have familiarised themselves with the system and subsequently chosen a registration status which allows them to operate outside of the registration system, as either a business or a non-registered organisation. The ENGOs operate as NGOs but do not hold an official recognition as an NGO. This is both an advantage and a disadvantage for the ENGOs. The next chapter discusses this issue as well as displaying how CYCAN and C-CAN are approaching both their legal statuses and the threat of climate change.

5 The Societal Concern

So far the last chapter has provided us with a backdrop on the state's concern for climate change and most of the state agencies, which address the threat of climate change and interact with Chinese ENGOs. It has shown how the "top-down" governance mechanisms applied by the agencies involved with climate change and civil affairs are included in the various factors that determine Chinese ENGO's leeway. For the rest of this thesis my research proceeds by exploring the social actors - the ENGOs - what their agendas look like and how they address climate change mitigation issues.

It should be noted that none of the two ENGOs have used the term "agenda setting" or "agenda". Both interviewees and the material published by the organisations rather use "prospects/visions"(*yuanjing*), "projects"(*xiangmu*), "focus"(*zhongdian*) and "goals"(*mubiao*) when addressing their own climate change related interests or actions.(C-CAN, 2011; CYCAN, 2009; CANGO, 2010). As already mentioned in the introduction, the agenda is an agreement on the organisations' interests where they emphasise working areas they think are best to follow when facing climate change problems. The term agenda is in other contexts used as a way to describe how NGOs, or other political actors for that matter, are becoming insider policy-making participants by setting complementary agendas for other (state or organisational) actors based on the NGO's effort (Murphy, 2007, p. 2-3).

5.1 The Case Study of CYCAN and C-CAN

I chose CYCAN as an organisation for the case study for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is the first domestic climate change youth organisation established in China and, secondly, CYCANs agenda on climate change mitigation is directed towards public participation (*gongzhong canyu*) and raising awareness among the public (*gongzhong de renwei*) (CYCAN, 2009; Interview 3, 2012; Interview 4, 2012). Thirdly, CYCAN's work is mainly concerned with China's next generation which, most likely, will face the consequences of climate change first hand in some way or another.

What made me choose C-CAN was its status as a collaborative network for multiple climate change organisations in China and its emphasis on cooperation (*lianhe xingddong*) with

numerous state agencies and other actors to assess climate change mitigation issues (C-can, 2012b). Moreover, it is a network that focuses primarily on climate change mitigation strategies. Finally, CYCAN is one of C-CANs network organisations. This links them closely to one another, which I find is an exciting combination. At first I suspected that this could make them less interesting due to a smaller chance of divergence, overlapping of work areas and promotion of identical positions and viewpoints. However, that assumption was proven wrong. Nevertheless, the two organisations' striking similarities at first glance are in some aspects poles apart. What differs the most between the two ENGOs is their concerns when addressing climate change issues, which again are reflected in their agendas. CYCANs agendas target awareness-raising while C-CANs targets national climate change policy advocacy. It has been observed through my case study, that the two ENGOs have different registration status, aims, collaboration partners, donors, methods and motivations for conducting their work on climate change in China and, thereby, choose different approaches and, consequently, develop different agendas.[17]

5.1.1 China Youth Climate Action Network (CYCAN)

Our parents, their generation, are not aware of these issues…so it is our generation who should take action.

-Fan Jie, Member of Beijing University Clean Development Mechanism club, in the Economist 2010.

CYCAN was established in 2007 and defines itself as a network consisting of 7 different ENGOs[18] (CYCAN, 2009, p. 3; Interview 3, 2012). It is registered as a business at SAIC and is mainly sponsored by private donors. As a registered enterprise they need to pay an income tax rate of 5 % on all donations and they must renew their registration annually (Interview 5, 2012). The organisation has around 30 unpaid members working both domestically and internationally and relies on most of its work to be done on a voluntary basis. CYCAN is one of the 16 member organisations in C-CAN (CYCAN, 2009, p. 3; C-can, 2012a; Interview 3, 2012).

[17] See Chapter 2 for all the details around the use of methodology of this case study.
[18] The co-funding organisations in this network are: UNEP-TUNZA-NEAYEN, Taking it Global-China, CDM Club of Beijing University, China Green Student Forum, The College Environmental Groups Forum in China, Solargeneration-Greenpeace, China's Green Beat (CYCAN, 2009, p. 3). (See the overview of Chinese wording and phrases in Appendix 1 for these organisations' Chinese names).

The organisation is engaged in various types of work and has currently four main activities on its agenda (Interview 3, 2012).[19] Its main effort is the "Higher Education Institutions (HEI)" campaign (*Zhongguo gaoxiao nenghao shuju diaoyan*) which is a programme aimed at doing research on University campuses' energy consumption, evaluating their energy consumption efficiency, scientifically supporting their energy conservation and emission reduction programmes. This campaign is known under the English slogan "Green Campus" (CYCAN, 2009, p. 9-16). The target of this campaign is, in addition to lowering emissions, to establish a formalised management that can make the cooperation of the institutes, NGOs and the contract mechanisms with partners involved in the campaign easier. The establishment of China Energy Consumption Standards for HEIs is the main target of this campaign, which is scheduled to end in August 2012 (CYCAN, 2009, p. 10-15; Interview 3, 2012).

CYCANs second main activity is focusing on sending a delegation of youth members to the next COP meeting[20] to participate as observers in the negotiation process (Interview 3, 2012). The organisation's third and most recent project is an exchange program for interns between CYCAN and an American climate change organisation whereby its emphasis is put on mutual learning and capacity building. This programme is sponsored by a foreign donor and was launched the summer of 2012. The fourth and last activity is the preparations for the International Youth Summit on Energy and Climate Change (IYSECC)[21] (*guoji qingnian nengyuan yu qihou bianhua fenghui*) held the summer of 2012 (Interview 3, 2012). At the time I was interviewing CYCAN, the organisation was about to start preparing for IYSECC and the COP delegation, so there is not much information about this yet. CYCAN has participated at the IYSECC before (IYSECC, 2010, p. 21; IYSECC, 2012).

The organisation's declaration (CYCAN, 2009) emphasises its desire to take on a broad range of actions related to climate change issues such as public education, research and campus-greening projects (CYCAN, 2009). By the end of 2012 they hope to reduce GHG emissions on Chinese university campuses by 20%. Furthermore, CYCAN mentioned that all their actions put much emphasis on and are based on scientific principles. They also encourage

[19] The activities on both CYCANs and C-CANs agendas are presented both in english and in chinese. Where there is no chinese equivalent to an activity, there exist no formal name on the activity on neither of the organisations' home pages nor in their brochures.
[20] The next Conference of the Parties (COP) is the 18th high level intergovernmental meeting held by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) where governments amongst others discuss the framework of the Kyoto Protocol. This year the conference will be held in Doha, Qatar (UNFCCC, 2011).
[21] It is a conference aimed at mobilising youth interested in climate change and climate change related organisations to participate and share their ideas (IYSECC, 2010, p. 1-3).

public participation and cooperation with the government, corporations, local communities and other social organisations (CYCAN, 2009; Interview 3, 2012; Interview 4, 2012). The declaration is emphasising various actions to address climate change mitigation, however CYCANs main agenda is raising awareness among Chinese youth regarding climate change issues and sustainable lifestyle choices. This point was especially made during the interviews with the organisation as well.

When asked what CYCAN's most essential work is, an interviewee said, "I think it is to educate the Chinese youth on skills and competence so they can discuss climate change issues and engage in that field. I personally cherish this growth much more than the actual solving of the climate change issues" (Interview 3, 2012). Following up on this statement I further asked why it is so important that the Chinese youth develop in this sense. Interestingly the reply was very similar to several other ENGOs' replies on the importance of development for ENGOs in China. Most of them said; "Chinese do not yet have the 'capacity' to take on this kind of topic and need to develop that before they do any other kind of development" (Interviews, 2012). This point was explained through the example of when CYCAN participated at COP 15[22]. The CYCAN interviewee witnessed how the international media listened to international NGOs when they announced their views to journalists. "These circumstances were not the case for the Chinese NGOs. The Chinese NGOs did not get this kind of recognition from the Chinese media" (Interview 3, 2012). The interesting aspect here is that the interviewee emphasised that the Chinese NGOs are not equipped or educated enough to promote their case in the media. However, there might be other reasons for the Chinese ENGOs not reaching the ears of the Chinese media. COP 15 was a critical negotiation process for China and can potentially be one of the reasons for this.

CYCAN is active on the social networking arena. They have 7 social networking accounts; *Weibo,* Facebook, QQ, *Renren*, *Douban*, Linked-In and *Youku*[23] (Cycan, 2012a). After months of maintenance starting from February 2012 their home page was up and running

[22] COP 15 was held in Denmark in 2009 where China was more or less blamed for the failure of the negotiations (Khor, 2009). This claimed "failure" might also be a determining factor for Chinese ENGOs relative silence at the COP meeting. For further reading on ENGOs attitudes and actions towards the climate change negotiations under COP 15 see Iselin. P. Stensdals "Deal or no deal-en studie av de kinesiske klimaaktører og Kina under klimaforhandlingene i København, desember 2009" (Stensdal, I.P, 2009), especially chapter 5.

[23] *Weibo* holds the same meaning as the English term micro blog and is the Chinese equivalent of Twitter. QQ is the Chinese equivalent of Microsoft Network (MSN), *Renren* is the Chinese equivalent of Facebook. *Douban* is a social network site for recommendation of books, litterature, music and more made by the users themselves, *Youku* is the Chinese equivalent of Youtube.

again in April 2012. The new layout of this home page is more upgraded than the one they took offline in February, yet it does not offer an English translation of the page's content as the previous site did (Cycan, 2012a). CYCANs online activity has been noticeably different after their new web page was launched in April. They post relevant material and update their social networking accounts frequently. It will be very interesting to follow this activity and revisit their progress in future research projects since this extent of online activity is a relatively new move for CYCAN and not included in this analysis to a great extent.

To sum up the general specifics of this ENGO, CYCAN is a social organisation, defined as a non-profit organisation based on voluntary participation and registered as a business at SAIC. CYCANs focus is on raising awareness, education of organisational skills and promotion of climate change issues to Chinese youth, especially University students. They also emphasise the importance of conducting qualitative research, which can be useful to the state. They keep a low profile in regards to advocating national climate change policies and place limited importance on participation in international climate change negotiations. By being a member of C-CAN they get invited to meetings initiated by C-CAN with the NDRC and other climate change actors. CYCAN further describes its membership in C-CAN as a good way to communicate with other ENGOs and to spread its own agenda. Apart from that the link to C-CAN was not further highlighted by CYCAN (Interview 3, 2012). When asked about the concern for their registration status, CYCAN claimed that they do not want to be registered as an official ENGO for the purpose of avoiding any potential limits being imposed on their activities by the government when running campaigns (Interview 3, 2012).

5.1.2 China Civil Climate Action Network (C-CAN)

C-CAN is a non-registered network. The organisation has 16 member organisations, however, several other organisations are in the process of applying for membership[24] (CCAN, 2011; c-

[24] After I ended the fieldwork I was informed by e-mail from one of my interviewees that two more organisations joined as members of C-CAN. However by the time of writing their names are not yet released on C-CANs home page, and consequently excluded from the following list of member organisations (c-can, 2012b). As for April 2012, C-CANs member organisations are: China Association for Non-Governmental Organisations Cooperation (CANGO), Xiamen Green Cross Association (XMGCA), Envirofriends Institute of Environmental Science and Technology, Friends of Nature, Global Village of Beijing, Institute for Environment and Development (IED), Shanshui Conservation Centre, Greenriver Environment Protection Association of Sichuan, Friends of Green Environment Jiangsu, Green Anhui Environmental Development Centre, China Youth Climate Action Network (CYCAN), Shanghai Oasis Ecological Conservation Communication Centre (OASIS), Green Earth Volunteers, Promotion Association for Mountain-River-Lake Regional Sustainable Development (MRLSD) (CCAN, 2011).

can 2012b; Interview 1). The organisation wants to promote and facilitate information sharing and joint action (*lianhe liliang*) at various levels with the goal of forming a wider coalition of stakeholders to address climate change. C-CAN also communicates and cooperates with Climate Action Network International (I-CAN) as an independent Chinese network on the international arena. According to my interviewees at C-CAN, the only limitations on membership in C-CAN are on GONGOs and student groups. The reason for this selectiveness is that GONGOs are too closely linked to the government and the student groups' activities are not considered "NGO actions" (Interview 1, 2012). C-CAN's member organisations are domestic officially and non-officially registered NGOs, which are all based in China. In addition, C-CAN also consists of non-member observer organisations. The observer organisations[25] attend C-CANs annual meeting and propose suggestions for the development of C-CAN (Interview 2, 2012).

C-CANs main interest on their agenda is to "strengthen the knowledge base and capacity of NGOs to work on climate change science, policy and public involvement; to participate in international NGO discussion forums on climate change topics; to improve the understanding of policy processes and participation in decision making; and to improve the capacity of NGOs for joint cooperation" (CCAN, 2011). C-CAN's home page claims that they "will continue to facilitate internal discussions among NGOs, external dialogue with the government and to campaign on climate legislation" (C-can, 2012b). C-CANs agenda and work is divided into two sections; the policy group and the campaign group. The policy group was set up in 2011 and is a platform for discussing and learning about national climate change policy (Interview 2, 2012). Its main focus is placed on communicating with the member NGOs, being a mediator for the Chinese people, providing policy recommendations to the state and making national climate change policies more transparent and effective (Interview 2, 2012).

The campaign group have four points on their agenda for the coming future; however I have chosen only three of them. The first one is the "Green commuting fund" (*lüse chuxing*) which is supporting activities for low-carbon commuting in cooperation with China Association for

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[25] The observer organisations (*guancha yuan*) are: Tsinghua University-CDM Research and Development Centre, Clean Air Initiative Asia Centre (CAI-Asia), OXFAM Hong Kong, WWF, Greenpeace, US Environment, Heinrich Böll Foundation, International Union for Conservation of Nature, The Asia Foundation, The Climate Group, The Nature Conservancy, Natural Resources and Defence Council (C-can 2012b; Interview 1, 2012).

Non-Governmental Organisations Cooperation (CANGO) (CCAN, 2011). Their second campaign is the "Exchange Programme with European ENGOs", which was launched in order for participating ENGOs to learn about capacity building across borders. Thirdly, C-CAN has initiated the C+ initiative (*C+shidian*), which is a campaign that advocates people from various locations and industries to adopt a more ambitious emissions reduction target than the legally-binding targets set by the government (Interview 1 and 2, 2012; C-can, 2012d). Beyond their webpage, C-CAN has a *Weibo* account, which is frequently updated and has 5903 followers, as of the time of writing (Weibo, 2012a). Just like in CYCAN's case, I do not have the space to elaborate on C-CANs *Weibo* activity in this thesis, but their online activity would be interesting to follow in future research.[26]

Going back to the registration status of C-CAN, the organisation is a project of the officially registered NGO, CANGO (Interview 1, 2012). CANGO was founded in 1992. It is a non-profit NGO, officially registered with MOCA in 1993, operates nationwide and is rated as one of the top 500 NGOs in China in 2011 (C-can, 2012a; CANGO, 2010). CANGO focuses on promoting "China's civil society development and providing a platform for the exchange of experiences and information for Chinese NGOs" (CANGO, 2010, prefix). C-CANs secretariat has been based at CANGOs' headquarters since 2008 and is not registered in CANGO. As seen in chapter 4, where the different types of NGOs have been introduced, the status non-registered network is not a category. The link C-CAN, as a non-registered organisation, has to CANGO is interesting. It is seen as a very crucial position due to the favourable relations CANGO has to state organs. Further it is an interesting aspect that an officially registered NGO is able to openly work with a non-registered NGO. All the funding C-CAN receives, goes through the secretariat at CANGO before being forwarded to C-CAN. C-CAN can never partner in a project due to their status as a non- registered network so their donations go through CANGO (Interview 1, 2012). Private, foreign sponsors mainly fund C-CAN. The majority of CANGOs primary funding comes from the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), however according to the interviewees at C-CAN, that funding is limited (Interview 1, 2012). The financial benefits for CANGO to collaborate with C-CAN are, based on these findings, preferential.

[26] Another campaign C-CAN is engaged in is the climate change education programme, however the thesis does not have the space to include this campaign due to its extensiveness (Interview 1, 2012).

In March 2011 it was announced that the Chinese government was going to launch an open process for a new piece of climate change legislation – a national Climate Change Law. C-CANs member ENGOs prepared a submission through several workshops where they reviewed the existing environmental laws and defined unified demands regarding the Climate Change Law. During this process the ENGOs also met with the responsible official from the NDRCs Climate Change Department where they got updates from the government's side concerning the climate change law (*qihou bianhua lifa jiaoliu hui*) (C-can, 2012e). C-CANs policy group put all the different parts of the submission together and forwarded it to the wider ENGO group for feedback. The final version was sent to the NDRC (Interview 2, 2012). The submission's content included guiding principles, the preferred structure of the legislation, mitigation and adaptation approaches proposals, institutional settings, innovation, finance and public awareness, as important points to the ENGOs. Most of all it highlighted the need for effectiveness, equity and transparency in the Chinese mitigation policies (Interview 2, 2012). Whether or not the submission is being taken into consideration in the drafting of the legislation is not yet known.

To sum up, C-CAN's role as the organiser and provider of a communication platform for national member ENGOs is paramount. This effort facilitates a "joint society" in communication with the government. The platform gives each individual organisation a voice and acts as a meeting point for the organisations where information can be shared and spread. C-CANs main agenda is both to strengthen ENGO's capacities and to do policy advocacy so the Chinese climate change policies can become more transparent. In addition, the close relation to CANGO also grants a non-registered NGO direct access to collaborate with state organs. As observed, both C-CAN and CANGOs agendas express almost similar interests.

5.1.3 The Two ENGOs Compared

Both the organisations, presented above, are non-profit organisations and are both primarily concerned with climate change. Neither CYCAN nor C-CAN are official NGOs and C-CAN also holds the status as non-registered. Both organisations apply the term NGO to their work, as the organisations were formed voluntarily by Chinese citizens, in order to realise shared objectives and to carry out activities according to their programmes (Interview 1, 2, 3 and 5, 2012). Their agendas share the aim of contributing to climate change policies by conducting useful and professional research that can be of use to the government. In addition they both

emphasise the importance of capacity building in order for them to stand firmer in interaction situations, with each other and the government. The two ENGOs place importance on exchange and learning from foreign ENGOs.

Internet activity and use of social media is also something both the ENGOs want to improve. However they feel they lack staff capacity to maintain this kind of online activity, since the process requires ongoing engagement, updating and frequent renewals to gain a credible foothold among their followers (Interviews, 2012). However, CYCAN is to a larger extent than C-CAN concerned with online activity. Since CYCAN is emphasizing reaching out to the young Chinese, this extent of online activity is a vital strategy to reach its wanted followers.

CYCAN encourages public participation and runs climate change awareness-raising programmes while C-CAN holds a more formal position, focusing on influencing policy and cooperating with the government. C-CAN is also an important focal point for the different organisations to communicate with each other and as an information provider. C-CAN is occupied with establishing governmental contact persons, facilitating meeting points and erecting a communicative platform for both the ENGOs and the government, which I perceived during the interviews as being more important than the actual policy advocacy. CYCAN, on the other hand, is more concerned with equipping the Chinese youth with tools to use when addressing the issue of climate change, and further getting the youth involved in organisational work. In most of the ENGOs I talked to, all their staff members are relatively young, this is also the situation in C-CAN and CYCAN. Taking the relative "freshness" of climate change work by Chinese ENGOs it should not come as such a surprise that the members are young. My impression is that both organisations are composed of engaged young people who want to make a change, either by reducing the threat of climate change or by contributing to Chinese society or both. C-CAN and CYCAN both stressed the Chinese government's need for ENGOs' contributions in its work to achieve the climate change targets set for the future (Interviews 1, 2, 3 and 5, 2012).

6 ENGOs' Agenda Setting Power

NGOs perform like a bridge connecting ordinary people and the government for that [sustainable development] goal.

Xie Zhenhua, in China Daily, 2010.

In this chapter I will discuss the ENGOs' agenda setting power using the corporatist theory presented in chapter 3. I will explore how the ENGOs are influenced by state corporate mechanisms or societal corporatist mechanisms. Further I will discuss my assumptions where I expect that the ENGOs have gained increased political interaction possibilities due to societal corporate mechanisms playing a bigger role today (Unger and Chan, 1995). More importantly, I will include the ENGOs' own experiences and views on their interaction with both mechanisms and extract what they believe are the biggest challenges they face when setting an agenda.

Firstly, I will analyze how the power of the state is dominating the ENGOs using state corporatism as an analytic approach. I will discuss how the ENGOs' dependence on the state guides their target on their agendas. Secondly, I will analyze the ENGOs' agenda setting power under the influence of societal corporate mechanisms. I have chosen three societal corporate mechanisms, or factors, that are involved in the negotiation process that is evolving between the state and the ENGOs, hence the international climate change negotiations, the role of media, online activity and online newspaper, and financial donors. Thirdly, I will discuss other influential factors that determine the ENGOs' agenda setting which are mostly factors emphasized by the ENGOs themselves, hence the ENGOs' capacity and credibility in their own ranks, in the Chinese society and in the state.

6.1 Agenda Setting Power under State Corporatism

Pearson (1994) says: "Under state corporatism, the state deliberately restricts the number and multiplicity of associations, officially decree their legitimacy and protects their monopoly, centralizes the organisations and imposes controls on leadership selection interest articulation" (1994, p. 32). If and how the state is consciously imposing on the ENGOs and thereby their agendas is something I shall discuss in this sub-chapter. We will explore how

”top-down” governance in the name of reducing climate change and maintaining social stability is in the interest of the state and is thereby controlled by it.

The state agencies described in chapter 4 which are involved with climate change policies and NGO policies are: NDRC, MOFA, NLGCC, MOCA, SAIC and MEP. I will discuss the authoritarian and disciplinary position these agencies have in relation to the ENGOs in the sections below.

6.1.1 The Power of ENGOs' Climate Change Agendas

Despite the NLGCC being the main forum for the climate change concern and that it is the highest-ranking agency for climate change policy making in this regard, I will focus more on the role of NDRC in this section. NDRC is the agency that handles the daily affairs of climate change that is the most in contact with the Chinese ENGOs, especially since the latter part of 2011 (Schröder, 2011, p. 20). The increased interaction between the NDRC and the ENGOs is due to various reasons. One of the reasons has already been discussed in chapter 4 where we have seen that the climate change administration has gained expanded capacity to deal with the issue, but also with cross-sectorial matters concerning the state (Lok-Dessalien, 2010). However, as seen in the presentation of CYCAN and C-CAN in the previous chapter, another reason is that NDRC discusses ENGOs' agendas, as for example seen through the climate change legislation proposal cooperation project.

Using the state corporatist approach, this increased interaction with NDRC can be another method for the state's access to the society in order to improve policies or function as a control mechanism over a societal sector (Østerud, 2007). The close link with NDRC is an implication of how the state is potentially using its connection with the ENGOs to “bridge the gap between the society and the state” (Xie, 2010). This “bridging” is a beneficial position for the state that can be used several ways. The connection between state and society can serve as a platform for the state where it can gather useful information about society in regards to climate change mitigation efforts, campaigns, and problems, just to name a few. By the help from the organisations the state can access information about society they wouldn't be able to access without them. By gaining access through a collaborating platform where the ENGOs are represented, such as for example what CANGO does through C-CAN, the state can use the ENGOs as a means to achieve better climate change policy results (Alpermann, 2010). By

engaging the "opposition", the ENGOs, the state is not only involved in the control over it but also potentially maintains control on how the opposition operates.

As seen during the case study, C-CAN and CYCANs agendas are not pushing for stricter domestic targets or policies than those already set. In this way the ENGOs relieve the government from inside pressure and higher emission reduction demands. One example of this is CYCANs HEI campaign that is aiming at reducing emissions at university campuses by 20% within 2012. This target is more or less in synch with the national overall target in the 11th FYP where the reduction of carbon emissions was aiming for a 20% reduction by 2012 (Xinhua, 2006). In C-CANs case the C+ initiative is also a campaign closely linked to national emission reduction targets, but C-CANs focus is to challenge the emitting participants to voluntarily reduce even more than what the state requires. By encountering the participants in the C+ and HEI campaign they do not put any pressure on the state to set higher emission reduction targets. This trend where the ENGOs are not demanding improvement of the national policies can be perceived as the ENGOs agenda are dominated by the state corporate mechanisms and are disciplined to only following national goals.

Another state agency that is heavily involved in the design of national climate change policies is MOFA. It is closely linked to the international climate change negotiations that China is a part of. The concern for climate change commutes between two crucial arenas which makes it a political sensitive area to be engaged in both for the ENGOs and the state: the link from domestic demands to the international demands. The sensitivity has mostly to do with how every claim made on reducing emissions or improving national mitigation policies within China is also of relevance to China's actions and targets on the international arena (Interview 1, 2012). If Chinese ENGOs' agendas were emphasising implementing campaigns where higher emissions reduction were requested it would consequently lead to an increased pressure on the Chinese state to take on more responsibility on a global scale.[27] In this matter, "…it is only logical that the corporatist state organs intrude and discipline the organisations

[27] China ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, however since China is a developing country it does not have to take on legal bindings as acquired by the developed nations in the international climate change negotiations (CNN World, 2002). China is therefore a part of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which is a mechanism providing the industrialised countries that are obliged to reduce emissions to implement project activities that reduce emission in developing countries, in return for certified emission reduction (CER) credits (Richerzhagen and Scholz, 2007, p. 16). This mechanism is initiated by the UNFCCC as a part of the Kyoto protocol's agreements. A CER credit is equivalent to one tonne of CO2, which can be counted towards meeting Kyoto targets (UNFCCC, 2012a).

frequently and is more on its guard towards their 'bottom-up' character displeasuring the state" (Lu, 2009, p. 43-45).

When asking the question what differentiates ENGOs work on climate change from other types of ENGO work in my interviews, one of the answers was the international dimensions of climate change as a topic. One interviewee explained this difference by suggesting that environmental protection in China is a less sensitive topic than climate change since environmental issues are easily something that can be portrayed as a local problem instead of an international one. To clarify this difference the interviewee gave me an example: If a factory is caught dumping wastewater in rivers the case can be "covered up" as an individual owner or a business is disclaiming responsibility or lacking morals. The problem is in the first place limited to concern the local area where the actual dumping is taking place. However, if a factory whose emissions are high end up contributing to increase the national emission rates of CO2 it is not only a local problem, but it is also bringing China on the international arena into trouble (Interview 1, 2012). Due to climate change holding a crucial position as both a domestic and an international issue, granting the ENGOs full autonomy where the risk of the ENGOs' agendas demands more action from the state, might put unwanted pressure on China on the international arena. As seen through the example CYCAN gave me from their participation in COP 15 where they were not heard in the Chinese media, this aspect leads us closer to the assumption of state control over societal actors.

To sum up, the corporate mechanisms discussed here; NDRC, MOFA in addition to NLGCC, might first and foremost influence the ENGOs' agenda setting because they are China's climate change policy makers and negotiators which can be perceived as guiding policies for the organisations' own targets. When analysing the relation between the state and the ENGOs through a state corporatist frame, these two agencies are seen as "disciplining" the ENGOs to serve China's national mission-reducing the threat of climate change according to national policy. Due to the ENGOs' agendas fulfilling the national target of 20% emission reduction and the avoidance of further international pressure on national policy, there is reason to believe that the state is heavily involved in determining the ENGOs' climate change mitigation agendas.

6.1.2 The Power of the ENGOs' Growth and Expansion Agendas

The state organs we have met in this thesis that are restraining and granting the ENGOs' growth and expansion is MOCA and SAIC. MOCAs involvement with the ENGOs seems to be the state agency that is the most crucial for the ENGOs' official and formal status. MOCA is the state organ that grants the ENGOs' official NGO registration and this agency is heavily involved in determining which category the ENGOs belong to and consequently their dependence or autonomy from the state. Further, the SAIC agency also determines the ENGOs existence because they control the mechanisms where respective businesses must register in order to exist leagally as a non-profit organisation . However, SAIC does not grant NGOs that register an official NGO status, they open up for other climate change actors through the business registration procedures.

How the registration system restrains growth and expansion interests on the ENGOs' agendas is for example seen in the restrictions set on international leeway for ENGOs. An interviewee pointed out how the official NGO registration is fundamental for an NGO to take part in the international climate change negotiation meetings. For the ENGOs the participation in the negotiation meeting in UNFCCC requires an official document provided by the state in the respective country the NGO is registered in, in order to get the permission to participate. Since it is prohibited to have more than one official NGO doing climate change related work this official document is not available for the Chinese ENGOs interviewed. However, there is another way for the Chinese ENGOs to participate in the international negotiations and that is by signing up Chinese participants from the non-official registered organisation as an individual member in an international organisation that holds a formal NGO status in another country. This means that neither CYCAN nor C-CAN can travel to the UNFCCC and be represented as an organisation, but only as individual members as a part of another officially registered NGO (Interview 5, 2012). Furthermore, the United Nations (UN) that organise the UNFCCC conference is obliged to enforce these rules as a necessity of an official registration permit, or else they would not only be working against the Chinese law but also the rules set by UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 2012b). This example of the official NGO registration permit pictures the role MOCA holds for the ENGOs' international climate change engagement. However, one of the ENGOs interviewed was very upset by this international representation "lockout". Others did not view this as specifically problematic since they got to send individual members together with partner organisations instead.

The last state corporation involved with ENGOs in this thesis is MEP. I have included MEP since it is the acting professional management unit for CANGO, who again provide the funds for its members, C-CAN and further CYCAN (Interview 1, 2012). Funding issues for ENGOs will be discussed under "6.2 agenda setting under societal corporatism" since the case study in this thesis covers two non-officially registered ENGOs who retrieve most of their funding from outside the state mechanisms.

The restrictive methods on policy development and registration procedures presented above can be categorized as "attempts to create a state corporatist system of interest representation that helps co-opt societal actors into the organisational fold of the party state" (Alpermann, 2010, p. 131). This is an essential point often emphasized by authors proposing a state corporatist model to explain NGOs in China. Considering this point Alpermann is making, it is possible to suggest that the strong link C-CAN has to CANGO can also be seen as a way for the state to intrude all the climate change related ENGOs in China. By cooperating with C-CAN, CANGO also has access to C-CANs financial donors and member organisations. Based on this assumption, the question if CANGO is potentially serving as a GONGO emerges. According to Heggelund (2004), GONGOs are state agencies and consist mainly of scholars, policy-makers and government officials and are very closely linked to the state. However, to judge where the line between an officially registered NGO and a GONGO goes, is not easy to tell. Additionally, it is even more difficult to evaluate this link especially when having excluded who CANGOs employees are, from this research. This assumtption can not be proven correct nor incorrect, however, when taking C-CANs existance on the primises of CANGOs registration status, it gives us reasons to believe that C-CAN is one step closer to state corporate organs than CYCAN. On the other hand, an unregistered organisations close interaction with state organs can also indicate the importance of the ENGOs themselves.

6.2 Autonomous or Dependent Agendas?

When discussing agenda setting it is highly relevant to discuss what Østerud (2007) describes as a difficult task regarding separation and tension between the two variants of corporatism, namely the commuting between influence and discipline of the actors (2007, p. 77). Even though the task is difficult, addressing the ENGOs' autonomy from the state and dependence on it is vital for our further understanding of the relation between the two entities (Lu, 2009). "Many scholars believe that Chinese NGOs lack autonomy" (Lu, 2009, p. 29). This

assumption is most likely based on the rigid registration system for NGOs. As described above, the ENGOs cannot exist legally unless they are registered in MOCA, SAIC or as in C-CANs case, through an officially registered NGO.

Autonomy can be defined as "self-governing" or "independence" but it holds various meanings according to what discipline it belongs to ("Autonomy", 2012). It is implied that autonomy is equated with "self-governing possibilities". The expectation that NGOs are more genuine non-governmental and more autonomous and closer to the "grassroots" is often an unconscious expectation incorporated in the debate on Chinese NGO activity. This expectation has also been a challenge for me carrying out this research. NGOs' autonomy usually stand in relation to their political circumstances. The political circumstance in a party-state is quite different than in a democracy. "Bottom-up" mechanisms are more likely to be welcomed and incorporated in a democratic state. Based on this the road from linking autonomy as a necessity in order for an NGO to be a political influential organisation is short.

When autonomy is limited, the "top-down" mechanisms are more involved. However, this does not necessarily mean that lack of autonomy forces the ENGOs to set another agenda than their own. A question that arises is how ENGOs under state corporatism are shaping a self-governing agenda, hence an autonomous agenda setting? Does the lack of autonomy naturally imply that the ENGOs' agendas and activities are more linked to the government policies for climate change mitigation? This dependency when setting a climate change mitigation agenda that challenges the national agenda has been suggested in the sub-chapter above. It has been noted in this thesis and in previous research that the climate change-concerned ENGOs' agendas are set in compliance with national policy and follow the large climate change policy lines rather than pushing for their own interests (Stensdal, 2009, p. 61). What has been observed by researchers concerning the lack of autonomy for NGOs and seen under the case study is here confirmed. However, it can be argued that autonomy can be achieved by working with the existing political system in China, which is what most Chinese NGOs do and it leaves them in the eyes of international NGOs less non-governmental (Xie, 2009; Interview 4, 2012).

Being dependent on the state or being less autonomous from it also results in some organisations faring much better than others in terms of mobilizing public support or achieving organisational stability. Here, the lack of autonomy and NGO performance is related. The question of performance, hence capacity and credibility will be discussed under

section 6.3 as it is of crucial matter to CYCAN and C-CAN in how they conduct campaigns and as one of the biggest reason for their agendas placing such a large emphasis on capacity building. Nonetheless, Lu (2009) notices in her research on Chinese NGOs that officially registered NGOs have more capacity and credibility to conduct successful campaigns in China. The funding from the state and the legitimacy the NGOs receive as a partly state corporate organ strengthens the credibility and gives them a position that makes them more successful in society (Lu, 2009). Being aware of the benefits of cooperation with the state can be seen as a clear incentive for obtaining close relations to state agencies in order for the ENGOs to conduct their campaigns. One may say that "dependence" on the state is also a well-perceived strategy used by the ENGOs. C-CANs strong link to CANGO is not completely a potential "top-down" approach as implied above, but also a "bottom-up" approach, because C-CAN experiences that cooperation with the state is more efficient when doing campaigns (Informal interview 4, 2012). Lu states that NGOs gain political legitimacy by showing that they accept the existing political order and conform state ideology. The type of legitimacy is also crucial to the survival of an NGO in China (Lu, 2009, p. 21-22). However, it should not be forgotten that some NGOs also relinquish autonomy in order for the organisation to better promote the interests of its members (Lu, 2009, p. 47). In CYCANs case, dependence on the state is a less wanted position to be in because it potentially limits the goals of their campaign. For CYCAN, they hold a low-key strategy to prevent interference from the state, but C-CAN place importance on collaborating with it.

Revisiting Lu's (2009) research where she is referring to close ties between the state and the organisations in China she claims that "just because a NGO is launched by a government agency, with government resources, that does not mean it will not find ways to pursue its own agenda" (Lu, 2009, p. 30). Even if using government resources this is not the case in this thesis, where we analyse non-officially registered NGOs, Lu's aspect is interesting to keep in mind. Registration category of an ENGO can be determining for its autonomy. As signalled in the interviews, the organisations are interacting with the state because they find it beneficial. However, the interacting with the state is more in favour of C-CAN than CYCAN.

The legal framework for NGOs puts them in the position where they must cooperate with the state if not the option is to perform as an illegal NGO. There are methods being used by organisations to gain more autonomy as networking and financial independence. Many officially registered NGOs are overcoming the constraints on their autonomy by using

personal relations, achieving financial independence, finding powerful patrons and offering their supervisory agencies benefits in exchange for more freedom. This is also the case for non-officially registered NGOs as well, where C-CAN is a good example. (Lu, 2009, p. 43). By overcoming these various constraints the organisations are not working in opposition to the state but on the contrary are connected with it through various ties (Alpermann, 2010, p. 125). It can bee seen as a way of leading leaders to become better leaders.

As seen above, the question of autonomy from and dependence on the state is vital for an ENGOs existence in China as well as for the ENGOs own identity, strategies and campaigns. The influence and discipline commuting between the ENGOs and the state has already been stated a difficult task (Østerud, 2007). What makes the commuting between the two interesting are the strategies and approaches used by the ENGOs in order for them to exist in the political landscape they must relate to. We will in the next section discuss the emergence of societal corporatist mechanisms in China, see how the ENGOs pursuit and take advantage of the more "bottom-up" mechanisms and further uses these when following their own interests.

6.3 Agenda Setting Power under Societal Corporatism

Societal corporatism is a political arrangement based on interest organisations interacting with state mechanisms ("korporativ pluralisme", 2012). The emergence of societal corporatism in China after the economic reforms is a fact noted by many scholars. It is due to these trends one can assume that ENGOs possess more interaction possibilities and enjoy a higher extent of agenda setting power.

The ENGOs' agenda setting power is not only determined by the Chinese state. In this thesis, built on other scholars' research of the emergence of societal corporatism, I have chosen to explore how the international climate change negotiations, the online media and financial donors are a part of this emergence. These factors are just a few of many noticeable factors of societal corporatism. There are other interest groups, which are relevant for research conducted on interaction with the Chinese state on climate change mitigation issues. Intergovernmental organisations, such as the UN, and research associations, such as the

NCSC, should also be included in this section on the emergence of societal corporatism, however, these factors will not be included in this thesis due to space constraints.[28]

6.3.1 International Climate Change Negotiations

We have already examined the international climate change negotiations and the obstacles the international dimensions impose to the ENGOs when working on domestic climate change issues. However, one very important factor, which is belived to connect the international climate change negotiations as a factor that enhance the scope of the ENGOs agenda setting, is the pressure these negotiations impose on the Chinese state. This pressure is interacting with the state both when it comes to the development and implementing of climate change policies in addition to being a factor that gives the ENGOs backup and leeway when promoting their own climate change agendas. The ENGOs, to various extents, want to participate in the international negotiations to both contribute to and learn from them. Despite the obstacles of climate change being a sensitive topic for China, the international negotiations of climate change causes external pressure on the Chinese state that China has been willing to accept parts of e.g. the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002. In this manner the international negotiations are already putting pressure on the Chinese state to take action. This is an advantage for the ENGOs when they communicate their interests to the Chinese state.

When being introduced to this slogan under an interview: “Chinese first, global citizen second” (The Economist, 2010; Interview 5), it was noted that a comparable attitude existing in the various ENGOs interviewed in relation to the international climate change negotiations. Neither of the two organisations want to put their own state in the crossfire internationally and neither do their agendas emphasise this. It is not seen as profitable nor a wanted agenda for the ENGOs to make their own state “lose face” on the international arena (Interview 5, 2012). The interviewee’s statement is emphasising a prioritization of nationality and was mentioned as an important attitude in the interviewee’s organisation hold. There is a gratitude for being a part of the great development China has had during the recent decades, thus how this has given them so many benefits in life. Putting the state to shame for emitting so much CO2

[28] For further reading on the various actors involved in influencing the change in climate change policies in China I would like to suggest Iselin P. Stensdals report on *China’s Climate Policy 1988-2011: From zero to Hero*. Stensdal is extensively analysing the policy change seen during the last 20 years and analyses what actors have been involved in influencing the change in policies. Stensdal is concluding on tendencies that imply an emerging climate change policy sub-system in China (Stensdal, 2012b).

while enjoying the fruits of the development that produced all the emission is considered conflicting by the ENGOs (Interview 5, 2012). I believe this is a genuine wish for the ENGOs, even though it is also a way of circumventing sensitive political topics, the three-dimensional dilemma discussed in chapter 4.

6.3.2 The Use of Media Online

Some ENGOs are using the media more actively to communicate their cases and to shape public opinion (Schröder, 2011, p. 11). With media I am referring to online Chinese newspapers and social media. Both CYCAN and C-CAN have their own home page and *Weibo* account. CYCAN is also active on additional social media accounts. However, these two organisations are not yet using these Internet platforms to a large extent. Both organisations said in the interviews that they wanted to put more effort into online activity when they could find the capacity to do so (Interviews 1, 2 and 3, 2012). So far, their messages are spread through the meeting platform in C-CAN and on both organisations' home pages.

The media in China is not exclusively a mouthpiece for the government anymore (Zhan, 2011, p. 155). That is one of the reasons why I chose to categorise the use of media as a part of societal corporatism. Richerzhagen and Scholtz (2007), in their discussion paper on China's capacities for mitigating climate change, claim that the media is a vital mediating factor in the state-society relation in China (2007, p. 21). How the Chinese media plays a role in the climate change issue in China is important to discuss in relation to the topic of this thesis; to what extent the Chinese ENGOs can set their own agenda and to what extent other factors and the state determines this for them. Media in China is obliged to develop close links with state corporate organs in order for them to maintain their ability to work (Richerzhagen and Scholz, 2007, p. 21). This is, as we have seen under the discussion of autonomy and dependence a way for an interest group to exist within the framework they operate in. However, the alliance between the media and societal actors is taking place and is a possible way to exert influence (Zhan, 2011, p. 115).

Boyce (2009) claims that the release of the climate change report in December 2006 initiated the media's focus on the issue in China (Boyce, 2009, p. 160). At that time, most of the media's coverage consisted of translated, scientific reports or scientific news from the West on global warming, often cited matter-of-factly. In addition, few articles were linking the

Chinese CO2 levels with the growing climate change problem (Tolan and Nan, 2007). The reason for this is most likely two sided. On the one side, climate change is a new topic that gained political recognition as a cause of concern as late as the 12th FYP and thereby received little focus in the media. On the other side, Chinese media is more or less state run and by that the government controls its content to a certain extent, consequently this also applies to climate change related media coverage. News production in China still operates in an authoritarian political system, in which the political leadership aims to guide and control both the media and public opinion (International Media Support, February 2010). The Chinese media in general has developed significantly as a result of ideological and socio-economic changes. These include: commercialization; globalization; the rising consciousness of media's social and cultural responsibilities in Chinese public discourse (International Media Support, 2010). The "spaces" that have opened up for journalists reporting on the environment and climate change has widened due to the above mentioned reasons, however, the characteristics of climate change and environmental protection can only be assessed through public awareness and information (International Media Support, 2010). The media is a powerful tool for spreading a "green message" (International Media Support, 2012) and is further a useful tool for implementing campaigns by both the state's and ENGOs' agendas.

In recent times the opening up of the Chinese media and the *Weibo* activity by Chinese netizens, has gained immense attention in relation to the various political situations taking place in China before the coming reshuffling of the Party's Politburo in October this year (Rønneberg, 2012). How the media, especially *Weibo*, can be a channel for the interest groups used for the same purpose as the state corporate organs do, was demonstrated by a meeting with a Chinese climate change activist who is not a member of C-CAN or CYCAN (Informal interview 3, 2012). I met the activist at a workshop I attended during my fieldwork and was told that the activist's ENGO had used an online newspaper to emphasise the ENGO's ideas and project to further achieve credibility among the civilians in the town where they were initiating a campaign. The campaign's goal was to increase the maintenance of bicycle lanes to improve the conditions for bikers in the city. The activist believed that by improving the bicycle lanes more people would use bikes as transportation around the city instead of fossil fuel driven vehicles. By increasing the number of bikers, the emissions from the transportation sector would decrease resulting in an improvement of the air quality in the city due to the reduced CO2 emission from transportation. To promote the ENGO's campaign, photographs were taken of places where improvement for bicycle transportation had to be

done. For example, pictures were taken of concrete blocks in bicycle lanes that were lacking logistical solutions for transportation possibilities and posted on *Weibo*. The campaign was also contributed to by several activists riding their bikes around the city, placing notes on the windscreens of cars that were parked in bicycle lanes, informing the drivers of the complications and dangers their vehicles posed for cyclists. The activist's campaign was successful insofar as it managed to prompt the local government to improve the conditions of bicycle lanes in the city. What gained more attention in this campaign was how the ENGO had managed to get the government's attention by also writing articles about the campaign in the local newspaper that resulted in an replying article from the government within days. This negotiation process between the ENGO and the local government of the city was in retrospect praised by the local government for its persistence and successful ending (Informal interview 3, 2012).

The campaign was also noted by other attendees at the workshop this story was told at, due to its communicative achievement resulting in the ENGO's voices being heard by the government in the end. However, it was quietly noted by one of the attendees that this process and campaign would not be possible in a bigger city. The attendee said the reason for this was the insignificance of such a case where the competition between urgent emission reduction priorities and less urgent ones is of dimensional difference. The success story from one ENGO in a bigger city in China can cause a domino effect that leads to many more and be considered a potential threat to China's social stability, however, this aspect was not commented on by the workshop attendees. The type of successful media action seen in this example has not been the case for CYCAN or C-CAN, however it was repeatedly mentioned how the media holds the key for all the ENGOs to spread the message both within and outside of China (Interviews, 2012).[29]

Some ENGOs that were interviewed believe the media portrayal of China in the West to be incorrect and that they shed a light on China that is very negative (Interview 3 and 5, 2012). In this context it is considered an important task for ENGOs to mediate both domestic and abroad what the actual situation is through the media (Interview 3, 2012). This position, siding and strengthening its nation's position in the international media was counterbalanced

[29] The importance of rural-urban residing for the ENGOs has not been included in this thesis, however it is a noticeable and unquestionable influencial factor for the ENGOs agendas in terms doing political or social work. I mention this point due to the fact that the ENGOs with offices far away from the C-CAN office is not present during the network meetings between for example NDRC and the ENGOs.

in another interview. One interviewee made a point of the importance for ENGOs to voice their own ideas in the media and use it as a tool to empower the Chinese ENGOs, furthermore, to spread *their* message and thereby influence the government (Interview 5, 2012).

Media is to a larger extent portraying "bottom-up" wishes from the ENGOs, which grants the ENGOs greater interaction possibilities than without this mechanism. But on the other hand it should not be forgotten that the use of media is also favourable for the Chinese government as a communicative and implementing tool. In C-CANs and CYCANs case media is a more of a potential place to portray the organisations interests and agendas.

6.3.3 Financial Donors

Some would argue that financial donors have just as much of a say for the ENGOs' autonomy as the involvement from state organs (Hulme and Edwards, 1997). Financial donors move in between both state and society (Richerzhangen and Scholz, 2007). Financial donors are, just like the international climate change negotiations and the mediating power of the media, interest groups that are a result of more societal mechanisms in China. Financial donors are one part of the Chinese society and are therefore discussed in this analysis. It is interesting to observe how the donors are engaging with the organisations, the Chinese society and the state. It would also be very interesting to look into the background of the financial donors, who they are, how the donors choose the receiving organisations, how much money they donate and if there are certain conditions attached to the donations for the receiving organisations. However, this is a different topic that this thesis does not cover. [30] Nevertheless, non-officially registered ENGOs cannot exist without financial means allocated outside the state. This financial support is especially important when it comes to employment capacity and campaigning activities for the ENGOs.

All ENGOs I was in contact with during my fieldwork underscored the amount of capacity and time fund raising is consuming. Since the non-official ENGOs are not granted funding from any state agency they are dependent on financial donors to exist. Many of the financial donors are foreign companies, governments and organisations. Gaining private donor deals is

[30] For further reading on the relation between states, donors and NGOs implications for poverty reduction I would like to suggest Hulme and Edwards book on "NGOs, states and donors: too close for comfort?" (Hulme and Edwards 1997).

a way the social organisations work “outside the system” and diminishes their financial dependence on the state (Lu, 2009). Financial means can provide the organisations with a financial autonomy that enables them to act upon their agendas.

In one of the interviews it was mentioned that the non-official ENGOs see a rapid reshuffling of employees due to the low salaries an employment in the ENGOs provide. The low salaries are a result of limited means to spend on administrative positions which leads to bulk personnel reshuffling within the ENGOs (Interview 5, 2012). The high rate of young employees in the ENGOs might be due to the economic uncertainty of working in the organisations grant. The reshuffling is not only a problem for the communication between the Chinese ENGOs but also for the communication with the state. When the reshuffling is frequent, the ENGOs are also difficult to relate to for state actors (Interview 5, 2012). This comment was made by an ENGO member, not CYCAN nor C-CAN. How the organisations are emphasising on having good contact with state actors in powerful departments or organisations are seen as crucial to have a ”voice” inside the state corporative organs. This part was also emphasized by C-CAN (Interview 1 and 2, 2012), hence C-CANs close relationship with CANGO. This aspect is interesting when seen in relation to previous research conducted on ENGO activity in China where the assumption that the patron-client mechanisms still plays a central role in China today has been suggested (Xie, 2009; Lu, 2009).

A recent development has been taken note of by Chinese ENGOs of a tendency for international donor agencies to favour less developed countries, such as African countries, for donations. This trend is believed to be driven by African countries comparatively smaller financial capacity to support domestic NGO activity. In the case of CYCAN, they depend on donations either from donors or that the members pay the costs with their own financial means in order for them to send a delegation to the next COP meeting. This is only one example, however it shows how important financial donors are for the organisations. When it comes to funding activity for participating in international negotiation arenas, the UN can only fund officially registered NGOs in order for the donation to be legal in China (Informal interview 1, 2012).

China’s development has held a high speed and the country currently holds the status of a middle-income country (Word Bank, 2012). International expectations of an emerging class

of philanthropists[31] (*cishan*)[32] seems like a logical conclusion to that advancement (Interview 5, 2012; Informal interview 2, 2012). It has been noted that there is an external pressure on Chinese companies with increasing financial means to act upon the responsibilities of being "better off" and financially support local NGO activity (Interview 5, 2012).

The trend where international donor agencies prioritize countries with less financial means than China has also been noted in the state. One of the achievements CANGO obtained during 2010 was getting the right qualifications to provide tax deductions of public good and relief projects, with a special emphasis on domestic donor institutions (CANGO, 2010 p. 6). This achievement is believed to stimulate more Chinese enterprises to donate money to the Chinese NGO sector. CANGO being an officially registered NGO has by this campaign focused on an increasing problem for the ENGOs that work outside the state organs. By that CANGO is negotiating on the NGOs' behalf's, suggesting that CANGO is not only being state corporate mechanism as prompted above, but also a societal actor helping the non-official organisations to gain financial means.

The main point of the inclusion of financial donors in the discussion of societal corporate mechanisms is that the non-officially registered NGOs are dependent on financial means retrieved from outside the state. There has been a change in donation activity towards Chinese NGOs which has made it harder for the NGOs to allocate funding. The financial donors are of importance to the ENGO's employment and campaign capacity, but also for their existence. If the financial support stops it can be considered more threatening to the existence of an ENGO than actual state intervention of the organisation.

6.3.4 The Invitation From the "Top"- Inclusion of the Public

The national concern for climate change started emerging in the last couple of years and the state has realised that something must be done for China to meet its emission reduction targets. Some believe that in order for China to do that they need to include the Chinese people and not only set internationally oriented policy targets (Zou Ji, 2012). Under my fieldwork I got the chance to join a seminar held by the UNDP on climate change. This

[31] Philanthropy is both a term that applies to the individual level, as well as the societal level. Philanthropy can mean the "goodwill to fellow members of the human race". On the other hand it can also mean "an act or gift done or made for humanitarian purposes" or "an organisation distributing or supported by funds set aside for humanitarian purposes" ("Philanthropy", 2012).

[32] The Chinese word for philanthropy consists of two characters *ci* (慈) and *shan (善). Ci* is translated as compassionate; kind; loving and *shan* is translated by good; charitable, kind.

seminar focused precisely on the importance of public participation in order for the government to succeed in meeting its FYP targets. The speaker at this seminar, deputy director of the NCSC, Professor Zou Ji, commented not only on the importance of improving national climate change policies but also on making an effort to analyse consumer patterns and looking into influencing young people's lifestyles for the sake of reaching government targets (Zou Ji, 2012).

The most related evidence to this will of inclusion is that several state documents are emphasising the need for public participation as a part of solving the climate change crisis (Xinhua 2011b, chapter 4; Dong, 2010; Xie, 2009, p. 30)."Incorporating public and voluntary groups in environmental policy-making has been emphasized by central government in a serie of documents and regulations" (Xie, 2009, p. 30). In section four of the White Paper[33] (*Baipishu*) on climate change issued before the Durban high level meeting in 2011 "participation of the whole society" (Xinhua, 2011b, chapter 4), is highlighted. The White Paper claims that: "China proactively publicizes relevant scientific knowledge in addressing climate change, enhances public awareness of low-carbon development, gives full play to the initiatives of non-governmental organisations, the media and other outlets, and uses various channels and measures to guide the whole society to participate in actions addressing climate change" (Xinhua, 2011 b, chapter 4). This quote is the government's attempt to describe the relation between climate change and public awareness as well as emphasising how media, organisations and other channels are working together with the government. The rest of the White Paper's section four concerns the media, public participation, government guidance and proactive actions by non-governmental organisations. Due to the strong evidence for how the state is limiting the "full play to the initiatives of non-governmental organisations" throughout the thesis, the White Papers notion of public participation can be questioned (Xinhua, 2011 b, chapter 4). However, I would like to once again revisit Østeruds definition of societal corporatism that highlights how an invitation from the "top" is an indicator of societal corporatism.

It should also be mentioned that there exist fractions within the state based on the preference of inclusion or exclusion of ENGOs in state matters. According to my interviewees, one side viewed ENGOs as important for the interest representation of the Chinese people and also the importance to include the Chinese people in climate change mitigation. On the other side

[33] White Paper is a governmental report on a political issue (Merriam Webster, 2012).

there are other fractions in the state that do not recognise the benefits of interest groups and further view the NGO sector as a threat to the state and to a harmonious development of the society (Interview 1; interview 2, 2012; Unger and Chan, 1995). NGO work is still controversial (Interview 1, 2012). In this sense I believe the “bridge” Xie Zhenhua is referring to in the quote that this chapter initially started out with will be where the ENGOs are playing a vital role. As seen after a meeting between the NGOs and the government in 2011 (Schröder, 2011, p. 20) Xie Zhenhua, deputy director of NDRC, said that within the recent years he has noticed how NGOs have arranged many "interesting and active" events on environmental protection and climate change which help to build an environmentally-friendly and resource-saving society (Dong, 2010). Xie Zhenhua further emphasized at the same meeting that the development of China in a sustainable way requires participation of everyone in the process of mitigating greenhouse gases and improving energy efficiency. Xie also welcomes NGO suggestions and advice for the government (Dong, 2010). The deputy director of the NDRC is one of the more positive state officials to the inclusion of ENGO work when approaching the problems of climate change. If his successor will have the same positive attitude towards the incorporation of ENGOs is unknown, however one member in C-CAN believed that this attitude would stay in NDRC even if the leadership is reshuffled due to the significance of the work ENGOs are doing for both the state and the society (Interview 2, 2012). Since the vast majority of the public is not overly concerned about climate change, the importance of ENGOs is even bigger (Schröder, 2011, p. 4).

Whether or not the invitation from the “top” would have been the case if the ENGOs were working on an even more sensitive topic like for example human rights, there is reason to believe that the will of including interest groups in the state would have been dimmed. The ENGOs’ agenda setting under societal corporatism would not have been that clear. The dependence on the society to meet the climate change policies might have stimulated a political will for the ENGOs participation. It should not be neglected that the emergence of ENGOs is also a strong indicator for a growing concern amongst the Chinese people, which has lead some to organise themselves as ENGOs to address the climate change problem (Schröder, 2011).

6.4 Capacity and Credibility on the Agenda

When capacity is achieved, then we can influence policies!

-Interview 5, 2012

Both CYCAN and C-CAN viewed capacity building as a matter of priority and a central point on their agendas in order for their work to spread and be approved (Interviews 1, 2, 3 and 4, 2012). Scholars (Xie, 2009; Richerzhagen and Scholz 2007) have noticed this lack of organisational capacity in Chinese ENGOs and consider them weak in previous research. This weakness is seen in three areas. Firstly, there exist a small number of informal organisations, secondly, their resources and capacities are limited and thirdly, they have a narrow spectrum of strategies and approaches to combat their working areas (Xie, 2009). Lack of organisational capacity is something that influences credibility not only in the state but also in the Chinese society. The attitude towards NGO work does not gain much recognition for the time being (Interview 1; informal interview 4, 2012).

During my fieldwork one interviewee shared an experience based on the lack of credibility when volunteering in a mitigation campaign for an ENGO. The organisation had invited Chinese schools to participate in a climate change poster competition where pupils were supposed to draw posters using climate change as a topic for the motives on the poster. When the ENGO launched its campaign at the various schools most participant schools required to see an official document approving that the campaign was initiated by the state. They further inquired whether or not the schools were allowed to join this campaign by the state (Informal interview 4, 2012). This was consequential for the success of this ENGO's campaign. An educated guess, based on finding throughout this thesis, is that by cooperating with the state or a state agency, the outcome of this ENGO's campaign might have been more successful.

Capacity building is not only about financial means as one of my interviewees in CYCAN pointed out (Interview 3, 2012). There are three sides of capacity. One is the financial, discussed above; the other is the quality of the action for which an organisation is specially fitted ("Capacity", 2012). The third point is that the ENGOs capacity is reduced due to the legal framework of NGOs limiting their capacity scope. These sides of capacity are important to CYCAN and C-CAN and are intertwined with credibility. CYCAN and C-CAN were both emphasizing that they wanted to hand over research and reports to the state about civil responses to climate change and further visualizing the organisations own agendas. However,

the ENGOs do not think the quality levels of their work are high enough to reach the ears of the state organs. This is an indicator that the organisations recognise that knowledge, education and credibility are factors that are influential for the pursuit of their own agenda. This aspect might be one reason for why they have chosen to collaborate closely with each other and by unifying and professionalising their voices they will increase their capacity to be heard. The ENGOs are networking because funding for climate change issues has been perceived as an area where only limited funding is available and this puts the ENGOs in a competitive relationship with each other (Schröder, 2011, p. 8).

Another element of capacity is language. When conducting exclusively domestic ENGO work the need for another language is not necessary, however the international dimension of climate change brings about the necessity of understanding and using a high level of English. This aspect was an unexpected finding I made through the fieldwork. When I asked what my interviewees reckoned is the biggest challenges for an ENGO doing work on climate change in China today, they mentioned the high level of English climate change work requires (Interviews, 2012). Since climate change is an international issue the need for Chinese ENGOs to use English is a fact that excludes certain actors from the scene of ENGO work on climate change (Interviews, 2012). Some persons that want to work with the topic do not have the required English level to do so. When ENGO participants do not have a sufficient level of English, their participation in international delegations where the communication requires good English skills, normally results in the participants being excluded from the delegation (Interview 3; 4; 5; 2012).

6.4.1 Summary

We see that ENGOs in China exist within limits defined by the state and the state can both enable and impede their development. Chinese ENGOs may be characterised as existing at a transitional level between complete dependence on the state and having some degree of autonomy from it (Whiting, 1991, p. 43). Some Chinese ENGOs are organised around government-defined objectives and are perceived to lack the full autonomy, as believe to be the case of the close collaboration between CANGO and C-CAN. We have explored how the ENGOs' agendas are restrained and incorporated in the state where they presumably are used as "tools" in order for the state to achieve better policy results but also to control the ENGOs' pressure on the state. The "top down" governance seen through the registration procedures for

NGOs, when looking into how the ENGOs' agendas are, are not challenging national climate change targets. The analysis signals that the state actors control, unify and conduct the societal sectors in this way.

At the same time, both CYCAN and C-CAN, represent and present a societal concern for a topic that also concerns the state. They are in many ways mediating an increasing concern in the Chinese society to the state. It is seen through the analysis that societal actors, ENGOs, concerned with the threat of climate change, have been given more leeway in recent years. Signs of the inclusion of the international climate change negotiations, also including and of interest to the ENGOs, is of support to the ENGOs' interests. The expansion of online media, especially social media activity and online newspapers is a venue where the ENGOs want to and are spreading their agendas. Further, the financial donors could not have entered the Chinese market if it weren't for economic reforms. However, their role is dual. Donors both facilitate and challenge the ENGOs' political interaction possibilities. Financial donors are a sign of increasing societal corporate mechanisms and are enabling the ENGOs with financial donations, however if the donations are withdrawn it has consequences for the existence of the ENGOs. Finally, the societal corporate mechanisms is seen in the political will of including the public, hence "bottom-up" demands, in assessing climate change. There are reasons to believe that the ENGOs are stakeholders that serve in public advice mechanisms (such as C-CANs organisations contributing to the Climate Change Legislation or the environmental activist winning a case through civil action). That the ENGOs are unifying themselves through C-CAN is a sign of a connection and association across the organisations and an indicative of societal corporate mechanisms. This networking approach is, presented by the ENGOs, chosen due to the organisations lack of capacity and credibility, but there are reasons to believe that they also ride the wave of social corporatism gaining a stronger foothold in the state-society relations in China.

7 Conclusion

The threat of climate change is a political concern both inside and outside of China. The state is increasingly alarmed by what the consequences of climate change might lead to in China and is now trying to address the "three dimensional dilemma" through building a low carbon economy. The inclusion of the public is one of the strategies emphasised to reach this political target. The public, analysed through the work of societal actors in climate change concerned ENGOs, are highly involved in the matter. It is in their interest to combat the threat of climate change, inform and engage both state and society. Through the case study of two domestic ENGOs, CYCAN and C-CAN, their agendas have been analysed.

The two organisations are non-profit organisations that target to reduce the threat of climate change, primarily domestically. C-CAN is an unregistered network organisation that collaborates closely with the officially registered organisation CANGO and the climate change department of the NDRC. C-CAN emphasises policy advocacy, climate change reduction campaigns in society, research support and collaboration between 16 domestic ENGOs in China. CYCAN is registered as a business and it puts emphasis on raising awareness amongst youth, climate change reduction campaigns at Universities, education and research support. CYCAN is a part of C-CANs network. The two organisations agendas differ in terms of whom they want to engage and reach. Obstacles the ENGOs' agendas face are campaign funding and outreach, credibility in the state and society, language barriers and registration status in addition to battling the Chinese society's low interest for climate change.

To explore the ENGOs' scope of action on the above mentioned climate change agendas and their relation to state actors, I have used corporatism as a theory in which this state-society interaction could be analysed. The two subtypes of corporatism: societal corporatism and state corporatism have been applied to discern and explore the interaction between the ENGOs and the state. When dealing with this theory, we see that there is both change and continuity in China's state-society relations (Lu, 2009, p. 136). This thesis has shown that the continuation of the state corporate mechanisms, thus the clear limitations to establish fractions and agendas that threaten the state's authority, is evident. Drawing on state corporatism the ENGOs are used as a method for the state to reach its targets, control the opposition and gain access to the societal actors ideas.

However, the societal change since the 1980s, has led to an increase in societal corporate mechanisms that interact with both the state and society. This is evident in combating the threat of climate change as well. The international climate change negotiations, the frequent use of online media and various financial donors gaining access to the Chinese market, have entered the climate change and NGO arena and are contributing to the growth of societal corporate mechanisms. The initial assumptions that the growing societal corporatist mechanisms in China have led to the ENGOs enjoying bigger political interaction possibilities have through the analysis been verified. The growth of societal corporate mechanisms affects the interaction between the state and society and the ENGOs' agenda setting opportunities. However, the scope to act on the ENGOs' agendas is not necessarily growing. This is seen in how the societal corporatist mechanisms still are under the influence of state control and furthermore, that fund raising shortage limits the organisations' scope to act.

This thesis has been exploring to what extent Chinese ENGOs are setting and pursuing their own agendas related to climate change mitigation and to what extent the Chinese state and other factors determine those agendas for them. In every state-society relation there exist tension between participation and discipline of actors. To decide what is determined by what or who is a complex task. However, throughout the analysis I have made some observations on the extent of independent and less independent agenda setting for the two ENGOs. Both CYCAN and C-CAN are to a large extent *pursuing* their own agendas. The organisations are conducting their work and campaigns based on their own interests; to combat climate change, network and raise awareness. However, the ENGOs' agendas are not exceeding the national climate change policy targets and thereby not opposing the state. The question of to what extent the ENGOs are *setting* their own agenda arises. Due to the tight link CANGO and NDRC have with both C-CAN and its network organisations it is difficult to conclude on what premises their agendas are set. Both ENGOs concluded that demanding more climate change action domestically puts pressure on Chinas international negotiations and is therefore a sensitive topic for the ENGOs to be engaged in, as it points back to their less progressive agendas. However, through the analysis of the two ENGOs there are no clear remarks made on the ENGOs wanting to set other or more challenging agendas than they already have.

Other factors that determine the ENGOs' agendas are how the international climate change negotiations and the ENGOs' joint targets are of support. Further we have seen how online media activity is an important and desired venue to set forth climate change agendas and

activity. In addition we have seen that, the consequence of reliance upon financial donors, which the ENGOs survival depends on, is on one hand making the pursuit of the ENGOs' agendas possible. On the other hand, in this case study the withdrawal of funding is more threatening to the existence of the ENGOs than state intervention.

The two ENGOs have in exchange for collaborating closely with an officially registered ENGO and NDRC presumably set less challenging agendas but are at the same time increasing their political interaction possibilities. The findings made on C-CANs position as a non-registered ENGO collaborating with the state challenges previous research on how the strict legislation procedures for ENGOs confines their work. It is an example that there are possibilities for non-registered entities outside the state to engage in state matters. Moreover, this collaboration and "invitation from the top" is also a clear sign of how the growing societal corporate mechanisms are gaining foothold in China. Since the threat of climate change is of high priority to the state there are reasons to believe that the role the ENGO's play in Chinese society is timely and a good way to reach public awareness about a concern that will affect society in one way or the other. Since the state is openly cooperating with a non-registered entity, one would like to assume that the importance of battling climate change together with societal actors is stronger than enforcing legal procedures. However, there might be other reasons for this collaboration which information is opaque, such as financial motives.

What would be interesting to revisit in future research is whether or not the extent of the ENGOs' collaboration with the state will be less when the climate change storm is raging or when the societal actors are becoming too challenging. Will this be the situation for CYCAN and C-CAN or is climate change such a crucial topic in China that the state will continue the trend of including the work of the ENGOs in the future? The signs of a larger extent of societal corporate mechanisms give Chinese ENGOs political interaction possibilities. However, if one of the mechanisms, such as donor activity, ceases, it will threaten the agendas of the ENGOs to a large extent. To look into the dynamics and tension within the societal corporate mechanisms themselves and how this challenge the ENGOs will be an interesting and relevant point in a prolonged research on Chinese ENGOs' scope to act on their interests.

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Appendix 1

Chinese names and expressions

Chapter 2

Hexie shehui-和谐社会

Chapter 4

Beijing Guoan-北京国安

Baipishu-白皮书

Fei zhengfu zuzhi-非政府组织

Gonggong canyu-公共参与

Jijinhui-基金会

Minban feiqiye danwei-民办非企业单位

Minjian zuzhi-民间组织

Qunzhong tuanti-群众团体

Renmin tuanti-人民团体

Shehui tuanti –社会团体

Shetuan-社团

Wangluo-网络

Yewu zhuguan danwei-业务主管单位

Chapter 5

CANGO-中国国际民间组织合作促进会

CCAN-中国民间气候变化行动网络

CDM Club of Beijing University-北京大学请活发展机制研究会

China Green Student Forum-北京绿色大学生论坛

China Youth Climate Action Network (CYCAN)-中国青年应对气候变化行动网络

China's Green Beat-中国绿色脉搏

C+shidian-C+试点

Douban-豆瓣

Envirofriends Institute of Environmental Science and Technology-环友科学技术研究中心 (环友科技)

Friends of Green Environment Jiangsu-江苏绿色之友

Friends of Nature-自然之友

Global Village of Beijing-北京地球村环境教育中心

Gongzhong canyu-公众参与

Gongzhong de renwei-公众的认为

Green Anhui Environmental Development Centre-安徽绿满江淮环境发展中心

Green Earth Volunteers-绿家园志愿者

Greenriver Environment Protection Association of Sichuan-四川少省绿色江河环境保护促进会

Guancha yuan-观察员

Guoji qingnian nengyuan yu qihou bianhua fenghui-国际青年能源与气候变化峰会

Heinrich Böll Foundation-伯尔基金会

Institute for Environment and Development (IED)-道和环境于发展研究所

International Union for Conservation of Nature-世界自然保护联盟

Lianhe liliang-联合力量

Lianhe xingdong-联合行动

Lüse chuxing-绿色出行

Mubiao-目标

Natural Resources and Defense Council-美国自然资源保护委员会

Promotion Association for Mountain-River-Lake Regional Sustainable Development (MRLSD)-江西山江湖可持续发展促进会

Qihou bianhua lifa jiaoliu hui-气候变化立法交流会

Renren-人人

Shanghai Oasis Ecological Conservation Communication Centre (OASIS)-上海绿洲生态保护交流中心

Shanshui Conservation Centre-山水自然保护中心

Solargeneration-Greenpeace-绿色和平-新能源一代

Taking it Global-China-全球青年社会－中国

The Asia Foundation-亚洲基金会

The Climate Group-气候组织

The College Environmental Groups Forum in China-中国大学生环境组织合作论坛

The Nature Concervancy-大自然保护协会

UNEP-TUNZA-NEAYEN-联合国东北亚青年环境网络

Weibo-微博

Xiamen Green Cross Association (XMGCA)-厦门市绿十字环保志愿者中心

Xiangmu-项目

Youku-优酷

Yuanjing-远景

Zhongdian-重点

Zhongguo gaoxiao nenghao shuju diaoyan-中国高校能耗数据调研

Chapter 6

Cishan-慈善

Gong gong xing dong-*公共行动动*

Appendix 2

Figure 1

Overview of the 11th FYP and the 12th FYP targets

The 11th FYP targets

Initiative	Target	Outcome
Energy intensity	Reduce by 20%	Reduced by 19,3%
Carbon intensity	40-45% (by 2020)	Fell by 1550 Mt CO2
Non-fossil fuel	Increase share of non-fossil fuels by 3,1% per year	Increased by 8,3%

The 12th FYP targets

Initiative	Target
Energy intensity	Reduce by 16%
Carbon intensity	Reduce by 17% (40-45% by 2020)
Non-fossil fuel	Increase the share of non-fossil fuels by 3,1% so it accounts for 11,4 % of China's total energy consumption.

Source: Moe, 2011, p.17

The policy goal in the 11th FYP was to reduce the ratio of total energy consumption per unit of GDP by 20 per cent in 2010 compared to 2005 levels (Xinhua, 2006). In this period China came close to meeting its target, reducing energy intensity over the five-year period by 19.1%, and increasing non-fossil fuel use by 3.1% per year, so that non-fossil energy today comprises 8.3% of China's total energy use (Seligsohn, 2011, p.1). Even though emission reductions were addressed in this FYP, emission reductions were not linked to climate change mitigation that it is today. Some of the 12th FYPs key targets on the environment and clean energy are that non-fossil fuel shall account for 11.4% of primary energy consumption; energy consumption per unit of GDP will be cut by 16%; carbon dioxide emission per unit of GDP will be cut by 17% (Xinhua, 2011a, Xinhua, 2011c).